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No , i:k6c:k 71-1225 
Gagnon v. Scarpel l i 
Cert to CA 7: Fairchild, Sprecher, Campbell 
Resp 
-h , ___..JJ er 
B~~~lwas convicted of a crime in Wisc and sentenced to 15 
years, :kN!RXX!RN:k!RNERX:kNXER execution of the sentence to be 
E pend~ He was thus on probation . He was arrested for 
another crime and his probation was revoked by the prison 
officials without affording him a hearing . He sued in distr 
ct which held that he was entitled to a hea_rJ;_ng and appointed 
counsel before his probation« could be suspended . The state 
seeks cert. 
The issue is the due process rights of persons whose 
ENNX probation is revoked . In Morrisey v . Brewer the Court 
held that a~ hearing must be held before parole can be revoked . 
... . 
- 2-
However, Morrisey while xxa: saying that the prisoner has a ,.___ .. 
right to retained counsel or a friend at the parole revocation 
hearing , avoids the question of appointed counsel. I n Mel_!!Pha 
v. Rhay, :i2 389 U.S. 128 (1967), ;s: probation was revoked, and 
because the def had RXR never been sentenced, he was brought 
into court for sentencing . The Court ruled that under those 
circumstances, the~ was entitled to appointed counsel, but 
it seems that the focus was on the sentencing proceedings. 
At..,[:t, the Court has not ruled on the right to appointed counselll 
at probation revocation or for that matter on the right to a -hearing , although MNNXXX Morissey seems to dictate the result 
of the latter issue. The EX:X«N:K circuits are split on the 
question of right to counsel, Therefore, I think the Court 
should grant this petition. 
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Dear Mr~'1.,;,ffoudon: , 
Jit~ ' 
~~·:,, '11' 
' . .,, ' 
I am working on a case involving probation and parole. It would ., 
be helpful to have th~ following information, if it _can be obtained without .: 
too much difficulty:·:,.· ·: ~-- · · . , ' ·· . , 
;,i: ' ·\I' f ,, 
;~ 11 ;;h'i~f.t' ',,: 
, 1. As. ·of the latest available reporting date, how many persons . ,, 
... ,.. -1!'1 ' ' 
· are on probation and parole in the United States? 
;,:.· ' . , ii ',,il ·1'1, ' r"':. ;; ~"' 'I 
,..,, 'W: 
(a) /. the federal system? 
' ' ffi,.. J:i; 
W', ~.' f,t~r ;t . __ , ~ ,. 
$'.~~JJ~) -, J.~ !he state. sy,~tE:m? 
'!c~ - ·('t'j'f i"' , ; r. Mi{ 
t-,~;:~ :k A\ • '' -AI " : • J. '. 'p X, ' J' ;:,.: 
· ' (c) Total of bot~ systems? 
r, -" %i,. ~1:i-~"-, . \. ,. ,, ·r i 'Ii ·~ ,1~ 
2. ' If the statistics are broken down between probationers and 
~ parolees, I would 11 {e to have this information (that is, of the total 
v figures, how many are on probation and how many on parole?) 
3. If statistical tables are readily available ( requiring no 
independent compilations on your part} how do the latest available figures 
',' ·· compai-e1with those of five and ten years ago? 
,, l ~7, ' ' "' ' ; ·'- :~ ~~':t,\i""" p 
'''1:,; U, • 
4. Again~ if the figures are readily available, what percentage 
of convicted persons are placed oo probation in (i) misdemeanor eases, 
(ii) felony cases, and (iii) tctal? 
" "' l:,i; ,f" " \}' • ' I "); 
-,."· 
0 
J:·,~i .. 2 -
' 
·(: ./ ~ 
,, 5. As of the latest available information, what ts the total number 
of persons presently serving time (in custody in some form or prison 
'fi 
or detention institution) for felony convictions in (i) federal institutions 
and ( ii) state institutions? 
~ ~· ,, 
(a) What percentage of persons convicted of felonies are 




,t .,, .• 1: 
(b) o·~ the statistics indicate any trend toward increasing ;:,. 
the percentage of prisoners who are paroled? ... 
-"'f 
Although you will know far better than I where to look, there is 
a National Probation and Parole Association (I believe this is its name) 
which should have these figures readily available form). If this 
organization is headquartered in )Vashington, I should think that one 
·~ of your assistants could go there and obtain the information __ in a matter~ 
" of hours. The FBI also may have the information:' 1: ," ·. , • ,·.,, '· ,: 
,,1 '·'"r , ii.~ .,- .1 '<I "'" .11_ ,; • ; u ff\,y , ' 
,,Jf feasible, I would like to have this data fairly promptly. All '" , 
of it may 'not be available in precisely the form outlined above, and so " 
you should feel 'fre~. to provide what is available generally in this area. 
;t~. .· ·\1_ 1 l ,, ', . il.s1<->,s r .. ' 11,>tS,, ~ 
,i: {- ·. ,J:·_ ' {~I; lit~ .. --.~~.·.. ·" • ~-. . "'. ,._'."'-~i:.. · (J/ -jj'.:'f,, ii(< "' f,,·.l;j. ~' . •:- r ,. '' ! f , ·11':\' __ 
'I With niy"tii:anks. · t· , 1 t,· -··. ,:>o · , .• ,,. ;t 
l 
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P. s. In addition to the fore going information, and if the figures are 
readily available, I would also.-liketto know either in terms of percentages 
or absolute figures or beth, ( 1) the number of probattoo revocation 
hearings that were held during the last year for which figures are 
available, and (11) the number of parole revocatioo hearings so held. 
These hearings are normally held before a state parole or probation 
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Mr. Edward G. Hudon 
Librarian, Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Building 
Washington, D. C. 20544 
Dear Mro Hudon: 
March 15, 1973 
Library 
The following information is provided in response to your 
telephone inquiry of March 12. 
1. Persons Under Federal Supervision 
Attachment No. 1 provides the number of persons under the 
supervision of our offices as of January 1973, and in June 1972, 
1970, 1967, and 1962. The figures are broken down into supervision 
types. 
2. Percentage Use of Probation--U. S. District Courts including 
District of Columbia 
Percentage 
Total number Percentage Percentage fined or 
of convicted imprisoned Placed on other dis-
defendants sentenced probation position 
$ % 
1972\ 39,587 46.4 40.9 12.7 
19703 29,859 45.4 39.9 14.7 
19674 27,073 50.1 35.8 14.2 
1962 29,499 50.0 38.4 11.5 
Sources: 
1Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts 1972, (Table D7)o 
2Administrative Office publication, Federal Offenders in the United 
States Courts 1970, (Tables DS & DSA, pgs. 108 & 107). 
3Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the United 
4 
States Courts 1967, (Tables D5 & DSA, pgs. 264 & 268). 
Ann~al Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts 1963, (Pgs. 133, Table 0). 
NOTE: Percents may not add to 100.0 percent due to rounding. 
\'" 
Page 2 
We do not have figures as to the percentage use of probation 
on felony cases as contrasted with misdemeanor types. Attachment 
No. 2 is a table from Administrative Office publication, Federal 
Offenders in the United States District Courts 1970, which reports 
on the proportionate use of probation in certain offense categories. 
3. Probation Revocation. 
We do not have statistics as to the number of revocation 
hearings but we keep records as to the percentage of unsatisfactory 
completions of supervisiono In many of these cases a revocation 
hearing has taken place. An example of an unsatisfactory comple-
tion of probation supervision without a revocation hearing would 
be in the case of a violator who receives a state sentence on a 
new charge and the federal court deems it inadvisable to impose 
another sentence as a probation violator and orders the probation 
terminated. 
Attachment No. 0 s 3, 4, 5, and 6 reflect the total number of 
cases closed in a given fiscal year and the percentage of unsatis-
factory completions of supervision in various supervision types. 




Michael Jo Keenan 
Assistant Chief of Probation 
·. " 
Attachment No. 1 
PERSONS UNDER SUPERVISION - U.S. PROBATION SYSTEM 
JANUARY 19731 
TOTAL 51,528 
Court Probation 36,327 
U.S. Magistrate 
Probation (formerly 
Uo So Corrnnissioner) 1,910 
Deferred Prosecution 699 
Parole & Military 
Parole 10,692 
Mandatory Release 1,900 
Sources: 























Probation Division, Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 
2Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, 1972, 1970, 1967, 1962. 
,. ~-:~ 
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'7o bl~ l 
89 U1it~d Stat•• District Court• 
~r ot Per•on• Convicted and Propo:·tioriatl!P Uae- of Probation for the Eight Of!•n•• Claaaea, 
Fio1cal v .. are 1963 - 1970 
Numb r onvi ted 
Offense Group 1963 1964 1%5 1966 1967 1968 
TOTAL CONVICTED •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 24,965 23,081 22,122 20,929 19,999 20,503 
CLASS I (Fraud, embezzlement, obscene mail)•••••• 2,490 2,180 1,939 1,632 1,566 1,526 
CLASS II (Income tax fraud, other fraud) ••••••••• 1,725 1,178 1,063 997 899 785 
CLASS III (Ligucr, Internal Revenue) ••••••••.•••• 4,517 4,445 3,999 3,406 2,893 2,577 
CLASS IV (Theft, postal fraud, forgery) •••••••••• 5,783 5,348 4,791 4,566 4,120 4,428 
CLASS V (Border reg. addicts, assault and 
homicide; misc. qeneral offenses) ••••••• I 1,502 1,070 1,088 1,158 1,284 1,321 
CLASS VI (Counterfeiting, burglary, transportation 
of stolen property, marihuan~, Selective 
Servjce Act, other national defense laws 
sex offenses) •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2,595 2,351 2,425 2,698 3,097 3,649 
CLASS VII (Auto theft) ••••••••••• , ••••••••••••••• 5,051 5,066 5,041 4,843 4,523 4,402 
CLASS VIII (Narcotics and robb@ry) ••••••••••••••• 1,302 1,443 l, 776 1,629 l,617 1,815 
Proporti¢nate Use of Pro})qtion 
TOT/IL PLACED ON PROBATION ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 50.l 50.2 49.0 49 .l 47.l 47.9 
CLASS I (Fraud, embezzl!'ment, obscene mail) ••••••• 83.l 84.4 85.3 83.l 82.9 87 .l 
CLASS II (Inccme tax fraud, other fraud) •••••••••• 57.9 57.3 57.5 58.1 58.0 61.4 
CLASS III (Liquor, Internal Revenue) •••••••••••••• 65.2 65,7 b4.6 67.2 69.6 68.5 
CI.~SS IV (Theft, postal fraud, forgHy) ••••••••••• 54.7 54,7 55.4 57.6 54.6 57.l 
CLASS V (Border reg. addicts, assault and 
homicide, misc. gener.:il offen~es) •••••••• I 38.2 44.5 39.6 44.0 39.2 37 .5 
CLASS VI (Counterfeiting, burglary, transportation 
of stolen property, marihuana, Selective 
Service Act, other national defense laws , 
sex offenses) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 36.6 37.6 36.8 38.0. 35.2 40.6 
CLhSS VII (Auto theft) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 33.3 33.5 34.S 33.9 34.4 34.3 




















NOTE, Exclude• for all years persona convicted for violation of irrvnigration l~wa, wagering tax lawa and violationa of 
Federal regulatory acta. See Appendix for com>lete o!fenae claasification. 
# ~....,.,. , __ , _ , , -- ii - - -···- "'"':" .. ~ 
~'·"-~--:Lt,=;_._ ... !•,-_;~ 
Attachment No. 3 
PERCENTAGE OF OFFENDERS REMOVED UNSATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF SUPERVISION 
TYPE OF SUPERVISION 
TOTAL 
Probation 
u. S. Magistrate 
Probation (formerly 





Calendar Year 1972 
Total number Percent removed 
removed from unsatisfactory 













Probation Division, Administrative Office, U.S. Courts 
Attachment No. 4 
PERCENTAGE OF OFFENDERS REMOVED UNSATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF SUPERVISION 
Total number 
removed from 




Probation (formerly U.S. Connnissioner) 278 
Deferred Prosecution 541 
Parole 5,978 
Mandatory Release 2,899 
Source: 











Attachment No. 5 
PERCENTAGE OF OFFENDERS REMOVED UNSATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF SUPERVISION 
TYPE OF SUPERVISION 
TOTAL 
Probation 
U. s. Magistrate 
























35 . 6 
22.6 
7.0 
1Annual Re2ort of the Director 2 Administrative Office 2 U.S. Courts 2 1967 
Pg. 159 Table 5. 
2 
Annual ReEort of the Director 2 Administrative Office 2 U.S. Courts 2 1968 
Pg. 154 Table 7. 
Attachment No. 6 
PERCENTAGE OF OFFENDERS REMOVED UNSATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF SUPERVISION 
































3Anrmal Report of the Director, Administrative Office, U.S. Courts 1962, 
Page 136, Table 3. 
.hprtutt <!fottrl ttf llft ~ttittb ~htltg 
JhtsJri:ttgfon. ~- <!f. 2llffe'!$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
March 29, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1225 - Gagnon v. Scarpelli 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
It,_. 11. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~u:µrnnt ~cu.rt cf tqt 'Jtlnittb ~htttt.l 
Jr1ulfyittgtcn. }0. ~- 2ag;1~~ 
March 29, 1973 
71-1225 - Gagnon v. Scarpelli 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 






~lt.Vfttttt QJottrt of tfrr ~ttittb ~taus 
Jlnsqittghttt, ~. QJ. 2llffe'-l-$ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. March 29, 1973 
RE: No. 71-1225 Gagnon v. Scarpelli 
Dear Lewis: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc; The Conference 
Sincerely, 
Re: No. 71-1225 Gagnon v. 
Dear Bill: 
My reason for ccncluding that respondent is entitled to a 
hearing is that Morrissey applied in terms cnly to a parole revocation, 
not to a probaticn revocation. The first question the present opinion 
needed to address, then, was whether a probationer is entitled to a 
hearing upon revocation. While I felt that the questicm was an easy 
one in light of Morrissey, I thought it necessary to decide it explicitly. 
Respcmdent gets the benefit of our ruling that a probationer is 
entitled to such a hearing only because his case happens to be our 
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.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.iu.prtmt (!Jcurt cf tqt 'Jltnittb .ibdts 
•as!fingbm. ~. (!}. 2llffeJ!.;l 
March 29, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1225 - Gagnon v. Scarpelli 
Dear Lewis: 
Since we said in Morrisey v. Brewer that our holding 
there was not retroactive, I had some difficulty at first 
blush with your conclusion that since Scarpelli did not 
get a hearing, he is entitled to habeas. You have undoubtedly -----thought the thing through much more than I have, but I 
wonder if some word of explanation in the opinion might not 
be in order. 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
,ju:µuutt <lfltlttt d tlf t ~tb ,jtaf.ts 
'llaaJringLtu. ~. <!f. 2ll.;i'l,.;t 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
March 30, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1225 - Gagnon v. Scarpelli 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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;"-' f . 
,ju.prtutt {!JltUrl qf tqt ~th ;ibdtg 
jraslpu:gbm. ~. <q. 2llffe'1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
March 30, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1225 - Gagnon v. Scarpelli 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely,r 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
~u:prtmt (!fct.trt cf tqt 1!lttittlt j;httea 
1llaalri:ngfon. ;ra. (!f. 2llffe~~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 3, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1225 - Gagnon, Warden v. Scarpelli 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 










"' ' ' 
-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: 
.inprtmt <!fourl of tlft ~~ .itaftg 
Jfufyinghtn. J. <!f. 2llffe~~ 
May 3, 1973 
No. 71-1225, Gagnon v. Scarpelli 
Dear Lewis: 
I am not yet at rest on your opinion. 
/ 
I cannot yet see how you can have a workable "sometimes" 
rule on counsel. The result of discretionary rules on counsel is to 
give rise to equal protection claims. It is a troublesome area. 
In the next week I will conclude whether to join, to join 
the result or write separately. 
\Jr{'~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
$,u.p-ttmt <qoutt of !qt J:tritt~ .Sta:ftg 
•as4ittght~ J. <q. 2llffe'!, 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
May 8, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1225 - Gagnon v. Scarpelli 
Dear Lewis: 
I have worked out my reservations on the discretionary 
nature of the appointment of counsel so that I can now join you. 
I hope my concerns are groundless for this is a most 
sensitive and important area. 
/ 
\ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
( 
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71-12~ 5 Gagnon v. Scarpelli 
,,, •. ' ,. 
-. 
( j 
/ \~.-~ f 
May 17, 1973 
Cases held for No. 71-1225, GAGNON v. SCARPELLI 
MEMORAN11UM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Four cases involving the right to appointed counsel at parole 
·.,.re,;ocation p ·oceedings were held for Gagnon v. E'carpelli. Vvhile 
::thaf case was itself a probation revocation case, we there set 
standards for the appointment of counsel at both probation and 
parole revocation proceedings. 
1. Martinez v. Alldredge (No. 72-5709). 
Petitioner was convicted in 1963 of a federal narcotics offense 
and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. In 1969, he was 
granted parole, but shortly thereafter was arrested for and pleaded 
guilty to a state charge of possession of cocaine. After serving his 
state term, he was afforded a federal revocation interview on 
December 1, 1970. He executed a written waiver of counsel and 
admittr:d a parole violation -- that is, that he had been convicted of 
a statc,, crime. He argues that he admitted the parole violation only 
after having been denied the right to appointed counsel. He makes 
no claim in mitigation of the violation. 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli held that one who makes no colorable 
claim that he did not commit the violation or that there were sub-
stantial reasons in mitigation of the violation is not entitled to 
appointed counsel. Accordingly, I will vote to deny. 
,1· .• 
'• 
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2. California Adult Authority v. Griffin (No. 72-780). 
This is a petition for cert to the Ninth Circuit. The California 
Adult Authority seeks review of three decisions concerning its 
probation revocation practices. 
In f'ennis v. California Adult Authority z 456 F. 2d 1240 (1972), 
and Wilburn v. Nelson, 458 F. 2d 502 {1972), both decided before 
this Court's decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(June 29, 1972), the Ninth Circuit established a due process case-by-case 
standard both for hearing rights and for the right to counsel. The 
Ninth Circuit applied those decisions to all cases pending before it 
on or after January 25, 1972. In the three cases involved here, the 
respective district courts rendered their decisions before Dennis 
and Wilburn. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded them to the 
district courts for reconsideration in light of Dennis and \Vilburn. 
I 
It did so after Morrissey,, but instructed the district courts that 
Morrissey was inapplicable by,J,ts terms (408 U.S., at 490) to 
revocations on or before .June 2~, including the revocations involved 
h_ere. I 
In its cert petition, the Adult Authority argues that no revocation 
rights should be affcrdsd to paroleef; whose parole was revoked 
before .. Tune 29, 1972. While we might conceivably grant cert to 
address this contention, it is clouded by the fact that to some extent 
the Ninth Circuit anticipated this Court's decisions in Morrissey and 
Gagnon. To reverse the Court of Appeals, we would have to determine 
the retroactivity of its own earlier decision. 
I am therefore inclined to grant, vacate, and remand to allow 
the Court of Appeals to reconsider its decisions in light of Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli. This inclination is reinforced by the fact that each of the 
three respondents makes different claims on the merits, ranging 
from the right to appointed counsel to the right to retain counsel to the 
right to present witnesses in mitigation. 
3. M'Clary v. California Adult Authority (No. 72-5770). 
Petitioner M'Clary, who is one of the respondents in No. 72-780, 
filed this cross-petition, contending primarily that a parolee is entitled 
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in Cagnon v. Scarpelli, p. 5 , n. 6. Because this case is intertwined 
with No. 72-780, and because it seems to me appropriate to allow 
the Court of Appeals to address this contention in the first instance, 
I will vote to grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in 
light of Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 
4. Gardner v. McCarthy (No. 72-5398). 
This is yet another case involving the Ninth Circuit's standards 
and the practices of the California Adult Authority. At his January, 
1972, revocation hearing, petitioner was not afforded Morrissey 
rights nor was he allowed to have retained counsel. Revocation was 
based on a plea of guilty to a charge of assault with force likely to 
produce great bodily harm. He claims mitigation, and would have 
produced witnesses on that que~tion if he had been allowed to do so. 
Again, T would grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in light 













MEMORAN UM TO TI-IE CONFERENCE 
,, 
Four cases involving the right to 'appointed counsel at parole 
revocation proceedings were held for Gagnon v. Scarpelli. While 
that case was itself a probation revocation case, we there set 
standards for the appointment of counsel at both probation and 
parole revocation proceedings. 
) . Martiri.ezv. Alldredge (No. 72-5709). 
Petitioner was convicted in 1963 of a federal narcotics offense 
and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. In 1969, he was 
granted parole, but shortly thereafter was arrested for and pleaded 
guilty to a state charge of possession of cocaine. After serving his 
state term, he was afforded a federal revocation interview on 
December 1, 1970. He executed a written waiver of counsel and 
admitted a parole violation -- that is, that he had been convicted of 
a state1£rime. He argues that he admitted the parole violation only 
after having been denied the right to appointed counsel. He makes 
no claim in mitigation of the violation. 
Gagnon v . Scarpelli held that one who makes no colorable 
claim that he did not commit the violation or that there were sub-
stantial reasons in mitigation of the violation is not entitled to 













2. California Adult Authority v. Griffin (No . 72-780) . 
This is a petition for cert to the Ninth Circuit. The California 
Adult Authority seeks review of three decisions concerning its 
probation revocation practices . 
In Pennis v. California Adult Authority, 456 F . 2d 1240 (1972), 
and Wilburn v. Nelson, 458 F. 2d 502 (1972), both decided before 
this Court's dee ision in Morrissey v . Brewer, 408 U.S. 4 71 
(June 29, 1972), the Ninth Circuit established a due process case-by-case 
standard both for hearing rights and for the right to counsel. The 
Ninth Circuit applied those decisions to all cases pending before it 
on or after January 2 5, 1972. In the three cases involved here, the 
respective district courts rendered their decisions before Dennis 
and Wilburn. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded them to the 
district courts for reconsideration in light of Dennis and Wilburn: · 
It did so after Morrissef?, but instructed the district courts that ,. ·' 
Morrissey was inapplicable by its terms (408 U.S., at 490) to 
revocations .. on. or before June 29, including the revocations involved 
here. · ' : · : 
·. fu 'its cert petition, the Adult Authority argues that no revocation 
rights should be afforded to parolees whose parole was revoked 
before June 29, 1972. While we might conceivably grant cert to 
address this contention, it is clouded by the fact that to some extent 
the Ninth Circuit anticipated this Court's decisions in IV orrissey and 
Gagnon. To reverse, the Court of Appeals, we woulg. have to determine 
the retroactivity of its own earlier decision. ·'• 
l.. 'J), 
:)£ 
I am therefore inclined to grant, vacate, and remand to allow 
the Court of Appeals to reconsider its decisions in light of Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli. This inclination is reinforced by the fact that each of the 
three respondents makes different claims on the merits, ranging 
fr om the right to appointed counsel to the right to retain counsel to the 
right to present ";'itnesses Jn mitigation. 
' .. 
~ 3. M'Clary' v.. California Adult Authority (No. 72-5770) • 
. · 'i, Petitioner M'Clary, who is one of the respondents in No. 72-780, 
filed this cross-petition, contending primarily that a parolee is entitled 














in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, p. 5 , n. 6. Because this case is intertwined 
with No. 72-780, and because it seems to me appropriate to allow 
the Court of Appeals to address this contention in the first instance, 
I will vote to grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in 
light of Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 




This is yet another case involving the Ninth Circuit's standards •, 
and the practices of the California Adult Authority. At his January, 
1972, revocation hearing, petitioner was not afforded Morrissey 
rights nor was he allowed to have retained counsel. Revocation was 
based on a plea of guilty to a charge of assault with force likely to ~ 
produce great bodily harm. He claims mitigation, and would have 
produced witnesses on that question if he had been allowed to do so. 
Again, I would grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in light 
of Gagnon v •. Scarpelli. : 
1: ~ 









(Gagnon) 3/9/73 ---------Rider 
Note to Bill Kelly: 
A point made in p titioner brief which we hav not answered 
r lates to the problem of "interstate cases" ief 20, et seq. 
I r onally see no r ally good answer to this problem, which 
may well be a serious one in view of the large numbers involved 
nd the specificity of the Morrissey requirements. I would lik for 
us to try, at least, to ee if we can write a footnote which might 
add a helpful gloss on the dilemma which apparently is created by 
MO_!'!.issey. The following represents an off the cuff first try: 
Petitioner argues, ith some reason, that the Morrissey 
he ring requirement impose serious practical, if not legal, 
problems where the parolee or probationer has been llowed to 
leav the c cnvictin state and be supervised elsewhere as was 
ture in this case. Under the :.llmlltBtlDaa: inte tate compact 
authorized by the Congres , effective in Wisconsin (Wisconsin 





provisions can be made for the out-of-state supervision of 
probationers and parolees who are authorized to leave the sentencing 
state. Petitioner's brief asserts that as of June 30, 1972, Wisconsin 
had a total of 642 parolees and probationers being so supervised in 




rel~lised by the Council of State Governments indicated a total of 
( 
/ 
24) 693 persons under out-of-state supervision pursuant to the 
interstate compact. Petitioner's Brief, 21, 22. The problems 
arise with respect to Morrissey required hearings, and will vary 
depending on the degree of cooperation from the officials of the 
supervising state, where and when the hearings are to be held, 
and whether witnesses are willing - when they cannot be compelled -
I 
' to attend a hearing in another state, and the like. 
It is not doubt true that added burdens and uncertainties 
result from the ~orrissey formulations. Yet, we struck the 
balance in favor of the specified due process requirements and 
















disruption. If necessary, changes can be made to adjust the 
interstate compact to the Morrissey-prescribed procedure. In 
the absence of formal agreement, law enforcement and probation 
and parole authorities among the states have iDrglx long accommodated 
themselves to the inevitable inconveniences of our federal system, 
and have displayed a commendable willingness to cooperate. 
The Morrissey requirement which causes petitioner the 
greatest concern in this respect relates to the rights to present 
witnesses, and to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses. 
With respect to confrontation and cross examination, petitioner 
may have over looked the express qualification to the effect that 
''the hearing officer [may] specifically [find] good U••M cause 
for not allowing confrontation." Morrissey at 489. There can 
be a variety of satisfactory causes for not allowing the calling 
or the confrontation and cross examination of witnesses in the 
type of' administrative, informal hearing required in these cases. 
' ,. 
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4. 
If it proves impractical or impossible to produce an out-of-state 
witness, this may constitute the requisite good cause. As noted 
elsewhere in Mm Morrissey, evidence need not be in the customary 
adversary form but letters, affidavits, depositions and other 







Rider A, p. 8 ( Gagnon) 3/8/73 
We emphasize, nevertheless, the informality and limited 
scope of the required hearings. The preservation of these 
characteristics is necessary to BC!Dt accomplish the penological 
purposes of probation and parole. As noted in Morrissey, supra at 
477, the "purpose is to help individuals reintegrat into society 
as constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being 
confined ( in the case of parole) for the full term of the sentence 
imp0$ed. It also serves to alleviate the cost to society of keeping 
an individual in prison. " In short, the primary objective is 
fehabtlitative rather than punitive. It is essential, the ref ore, 
I 
, that the system retain a high degree of tiedl flexibility and 
administrative discretion. A study in Wisconsin of the factors 
affecting the decision whether to revoke probation or parole 
aiqmack emphasized that: 
"The authority to exercise discretion in deciding 
to revoke or not to revoke offenders under super-
vision is considered necessary if probation and 
parole are to remain workable systems. A 
2. 
Similarly, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court in Morrissey 
stated that the ultimate decision "is not purely factual but also 
[is 1 predictive and discretionary. " Supra at 480. The factors 
entering into these decisions relate in major part to a professional 
evaulation, by trained probation and parole officers, as to the 
0//erall social readjustment of the offender in the community, and 
include due consideration of such intangibles as the offender's 
relationship toward his family, his attitude toward the fulfillment 
of financial obligations, the extent of his cooperation with the 
probation officer assigned to his case, his personal associations, 
and - of course - whether there havem been specific and significant 
violations of the conditions of the probation. The importance of these 
considerations, some factual and other& :mdduly entirely judgmental, 
is illustrated by the Wisconsin empirical study which disclosed that 
--
JDIIIX some 25% of the offenders studied (on probation or parole) who 
committed new offenses were [nevertheless] continued on field 
B 
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The training duty and attitude of the parole or probation 
officer is also relevant to the nature of the hearings and to the 
conditions under which counsel may be desirable.: 
''While the parole or probation officer recognizes his 
double duty to the welfare of his clients and to the 
safety of the general community, by and large concern 
for the client dominates his professional attitude. 
The parole agent ordinarily defines his role as 
:qm representing his client's best interests as long 
as these do not ccmstitute a threat to public safety. 
The police officer, in contrast, is concerned imx: 
primarily with public safety." 
* * * * 
"Revocation • . • is, if anything, commonly treated 
as a failure of supervision. While presumably it would 
be inappropriate for a field agent neverto n revoke, the 
whole thrust of the probation-parole movement is to keep 
men in the community, working with adjustment problems 
there, and using revocation only as a last resort when 
treatment has failed or is about to fail." C 
The revocation hearing, then, is neither a trial nor an 
adversary proceeding in the normal sense of these terms. In view 
predictive 
of the:p!Eidlbdlattu and discretionary characteristics of the decision, 
even the factfinding aspects of the revocation hearing may have 
little or no importance. All of these circumstances cast the role 
and need for counsel in a significantly different light from that of 
the lawyer in a criminal trial or appeal in which the central issue 
., ,. 











is whether guilt or innocence has been determined in accordance 
with law. The probation officer is neither a policeman nor a 
prosecuting attorney. As noted above, his duty to the probationer -
his client - is on a parity with his duty to society. The parole board, 
likewise, has the primary responsibility for implementing the 
restorative and rehabilitative purposes of the probation/parole 
system. If, as the Court of Appeals held and respondent urges, 
counsel were required in all probation and a parole revocation cases, 
the result obviously would be burdensome upon the state for all of 
the obvious reasons. More importantly the result could well be 
self-defeating even of those who believe - with well-founded 
justification - in the merit of liberalized concepts of probation and 
parole. If these heretofore informal and flexible procedures should 
be converted into mini-criminal trials, the battle lines inevitably 
will be drawn; the proceedings will illlx tend to become adversary 
in character; if counsel is provided for the probationer or parolee, 
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and disposition are inclined to be combative, zealous and bound 
by the high duty of our profession to present all available evidence 
in support of their clients and to contest vigorously all adverse 
evidence; and in the hostilities generated by the heat of adversary 
proceedings, parole boards n are like bodies - untrained as 
judicial officers - may well be forced in many cases by the record 
made public at the hearing to be less inclined to exercise a tolerant 
discretion in favor of continued non-incarcerated rehabilitation. 
We think the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the state 
is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for oral indigent 
probationers in all revocation cases. Such a rule would have the 
merit of simplicity and ease of application, assuming (perhaps 
without justification) that counsel in the requisite numbers will 
be available and that a state can finance the cost. But we find no 
foundation in the Constitution or in reason to extend the "full 
panoply" of due process rights to a probationer or a parolee faced 















at 480. In addition to the considerations discussed above, it is 
common knowledge that the issues both of fact and as to the range 
of decisions vary widely and unpredictably in such hearings. In 
what may well be the typical case, the probationer or parolee 
has been convicted of committing another crime, or some other 
violation of the conditions of his liberty has been irrefutably 
established by public record or athetw otherwise, or the 
/ 5 
indtvtdual himself may have admitted the charges against him. 
I 
While in some cases in these categories a probationer or parolee 
I 
I 
I I / may have a satisfactory justification for the violation or a meritorious 
\ 
\ 
reasm why revocation ts not the most appropriate disposition, 
amelio:ratory information of It this kincbdJf is often not susceptible \ 
of probf or may be so personal or so simple as not to require 
/ 
/ i: D 
eithe:r investigation or exposition by CO\msel. It is well to 
I 
I 
k47ep :In mind that we deal here not with the right of an accused 
I 
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rights of one who is a probationer or parolee only because already 
6 
he has been convicted of a crime. We thus find no justification, 
in law or in reason, for a new inflexible rule with respect to the 
requirement of counsel. We think, rather, that the decision as to 
the need for counsel must be decided on a case-by-case basis in 
the exercise of a sound discretion by the appropriate state authority 
charged with responsibility for administering the probation and 
parole system. Although the presence and participatioo of counsel 
in the great majority of revocation hearings will probably be both 
undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary, there will remain 
certain cases in which fundamental fairness - the touchstone of 
due process - will require that the state provide at its expense 
counsel for indigent probationers or parolees. 
It is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to ::hwiw. 
formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed 
in determining when the providing of counsel is necessary to 










circumstances are susceptible to almost infinite variation, and 
a considerable discretion must be allowed the responsible agency 
in making this decision. Presumptively, it may be said that counsel 
should be provided in cases where the probationer or parolee 
i -
makes a timely and colorable claim (J) that he has not in fact 
committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he 
is at liberty; (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of record 
or is uncontested, that there are substantial and documentable 
reasons which justified the violation and make revocation inappropriate; 
DII or (iii) that the issues in the particular case are so factually 
complex or otherwise intrinsicly difficult to develop and present 
to the decision-making body that the assistance of counsel is necessary. 
In considering a request for the appointment of counsel, the 
responsible agency may consider - especially in doubtful cases -
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A. Sarah T<. Hunt, !Jte Revocation Decision: A Study of 
Probation and Parole Agent 's Discretion, unpublished thesis, 
University of Wisconsin 1964, cited in brief for petitioner at 106. 
B. Se~ Hunt, supra, quoted in petitioner's brief at 106. 
C. Remmington, Newman, Kimball, Melli & Goldstein, 
Criminal Justice Administration, Materials and Cases, The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1969, at 910-911. n is interesting 
' 
to nott:r that this case is an example of the liberal policies 
praiced In Wisconsin. Appellant, despite having been convicted 
of the serious felony of armed robbery and having been sentenced 
to a 15 year prison term, was immediately placed cm probation 
and allowed to leave Wisconsin and return to Illinois. Thereafter, 
following the revocation which is the subject of this litigation, 
and after a brief period of JIii[ imprisonment, appellant was again 
released upon society (by parole) despite his confession - belated 
disputed - of another serious felony offense in violation of his 
probation agreement. 
---~··, 




















D. It is probable that a good deal of information which 
may be quite relevant to the exercise of discretion either by the 
probation officer or by the administrative agency which makes the 
final decision comes from confidential sources which, for appropriate 
reasons, w should not be disclosed on the public record or to the 
probationer. There is a parallel here to the confidentiality of 
information in presenting reports, customarily made available to 
sentencing judges on a confidential basis. As stated in Williams 
v. New Yorkz 337 U. s. 241, 249 {1949): 
"The type and extent of this information make totally 
impractical if not impossiele open court 
testimony with cross examination. " 
E. We are, of course, not unaware of the difficulty of 
11 
1eciding on a case-by-case basis whether counsel should be 
/i 
l~rovide~. There will be the self evident cases at both ends of the 




ttiJcal confessed or readily provable violations). 
/ \ 
At the other 
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3. 
which the presence of counsel will materially assist the decision-
making agency in ascertaining the relevant facts, and in pointing 
the way to •fijJISdua a just result. In between these obvious types 
of cases (which, with reason, we may hope will encompass the 
vast majority of all cases), there will certainly arise a certain 
number of cases in every state and from time to time in which 
the decision whether to designate counsel is required under the 
principle of fundamental faimess. Where a timely and colorable 
claim has been made upon one or more of the grounds set forth 
above, we think that both prudence and justice suggest the 
deslrab1ility of resolving the doubt in favor of the probationer or 




















A. Sarah K. Hunt, The Revocation Decision: A Study of 
Probation and Parole Agent's Discretion, unpublished thesis, 
University of Wisconsin 1964, cited in brief for petitioner at 106. 
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C. Remmington, Newman, Kimball, Melli & Goldstein, 
Criminal Justice Administration, Materials and Cases, The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1969, at 910-911. It is interesting 
-
to note that this case is an example of the liberal policies 
practiced in Wisconsin. Appellant, despite having been convicted 
of the serious felony of armed robbery and having been sentenced 
to a 15 year prison term, was immediately placed on probation 
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disputed - of another serious felony offense in violation of his 
2. 
D. It is probable that a good deal of information which 
may be quite relevant to the exercise of discretion either by the 
probation officer or by the administrative agency which makes the 
final decision comes from confidential sources which, for appropriate 
reasons, -w: should not be disclosed on the public record or to the 
probationer. There is a parallel here to the confidentiality of 
information in presenting reports, customarily made available to 
sentencing judges on a confidential basis. As stated in Williams 
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949): 
"The type and extent of this information make totally 
impractical if not impossiele open court 
testimony with cross examination. it "'>--
E. We are, of course, not unaware of the difficulty of 
deciding on a case-by-case basis whether counsel should be 
provided. There will be the self evident cases at both ends of the 
spectrut with counsel rarely being required in the more or less 
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typical confessed or readily provable violationJ{ At the other 
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end of the spectrum will be the <iHfiettlt and 09mplex case in 
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3. 
which the presence of counsel will materially assist the decision-
making agency in ascertaining the relevant facts, and in pointing 
the way to a just result. fu between these obvious cases (which, with 
reason, we may hope will encompass the vast majority of all cases), 
there will be a certain number of cases in which the decision will 
be close and fairly arguable whether fundamental fairness requires 
that counsel be provided. A sound discretion must be exercised in 
such cases which should be set aside only when clearly abused. But 
where a timely and colorable claim has been made upon one or more 
of the grounds set forth above, we think that both prudence and justice 
suggest the desirability of resolving the doubt in favor of the pro-
bationer or parolee. After all, his liberty is at stake. 
•. 
. - Rider ( Gagnon) 3/9/73 
Note to Bill Kelly: 
A point made in petitioner brief which we have not answered 
relates to the problem of "interstate cases" Brief 20, et seq. 
I personally see no really good answer to this problem, which 
may well be a serious one in view of the large numbers involved 
and the specificity of the Morrissey requirements. I would like for 
us to try, at least, to see if we can write a footnote which might 
add a helpful gloss on the dilemma which apparently is created by 
Morrissey. The following represents an off the cuff first try: 
Petitioner argues, with some reason, that the Morrissey 
hearing requirements impose serious practical,_,i.f net tegi&J 9 (2,., 
problems where the parolee or probationer has been allowed to 
leave the convicting state and be supervised elsewhere as was 
~ re in this case. Under the~ interstate compact 
authorized by the Congress, effective in Wisconsin (Wisconsin 
£ atutes 1967, § 57. 13) and in all other states, reciprocal 
2. 
provisions can be made for the out-of-state supervision of 
probationers and parolees who are authorized to leave the sentencing 
state. Petitioner's brief asserts that as of June 30, 1972, Wisconsin 
had a total of 642 parolees and probationers being so supervised in 
other states, and that as of January 1972 incomplete information 
released by the Council of State Governments indicated a total of 
24, 693 persons under out-of-state supervision pursuant to the 
interstate compact. Petitioner's Brief, 21, 22. The problems 
arise with respect to Morrissey required hearings, and will vary 
depending on the degree of cooperation from the officials of the 
supervising state, where and when the hearings are to be held, 
and whether witnesses are willing - when they cannot be compelled -
to attend a hearing in another state, and the like. 
It is no· doubt true that added burdens and uncertainties 
result from the Morrissey formulations. Yet, we struck the 
balance in favor of the specified due process requirements and 







disruption. If necessary, changes can be made to adjust the 
interstate compact to the Morrissey-prescribed procedure. In 
the absence of formal agreement, law enforcement and probation 
and parole authorities among the states have~ long accommodated 
themselves to the inevitable inconveniences of our federal system, 
and have displayed a commendable willingness to cooperate. 
' . 
The Morrissey requirement which causes petitioner the 
greatest concern in this respect relates to the rights to present 
witnesses, and to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses. 
With respect to confrontation and cross examination, petitioner 
may have overlooked the express qualification to the effect that 
"the hearing officer [may] specifically [find] good RXHXHB cause 
,. 
for not allowing confrontation." Morrissey at 489. There can 




or the confrontation and cross examination of witnesses in the 
type of administrative, informal hearing required in these cases. 
) · .. .. 
4. 
If it proves impractical or impossible to produce an out-of-state 
witness, this may constitute the requisite good cause. As noted 
elsewhere in iitm: Morrissey, evidence need not be in the customary 
adversary form but letters, affidavits, depositions and other 








The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding 
lm all but inevitably alter the proceeding in the direction of 
greater formality. Combative by training and disposition, the 
lawyer will properly feel it his duty to contest all evidence and 
to marshal all possible arguments in his client ~s favor. The 
Stat~ in turn, will surely feel it necessary to be represented 
by its own counsel. The adversary character of the hearing may 
well make the hearing body more passive, less attuned to the 
rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or parolee, and 
more self-conscious in its public role. And the financial costs -
for appointed counsel, counsel for the state, and longer record, 
10 
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R.ider A, p. 12 ( Gagnon)&: 3/24/73 
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will 
all but inevitably alter significantly the nature of such proceeding. 
If counsel is provided for the probationer or parolee, the state in 
turn will normally provide its own counsel; lawyers, by training 
and disposition are inclined to be combative, zealous and bound by 
the high sense of duty of our profession to present all available 
evidence and arguments in support of their clients and to contest 
with vigor or adverse evidence and views. The resulting adversary 
character of the hearing, certainly in the typical :max or,t,uutiua 
routine case, is not likely to be in the interest of anyone. The 
role of the hearing body itself, aptly described in Morrissey as 
often being "predictative and discretionary" as well as fact finding, 
may become more akin to that of a judge at a trial, less attuned to 
the rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or parolee, 
• and in the greater self consciousness of its public role, the hearing 
body may be less tolerant of deviant xmhrc behavior and more compelled 
2. 
to reinca cerate rath r than continue:ncaean:loc nonpunitive 
r h btlitation. Also the decision making process will be prolonged, 
and th financial cost to the state - for appointed counsel, a: counsel 
for the state, a Ion r r cord and the possibility of judicial review, 
10 
will not be insubstantial. 
Rider A, p. 8 ( Gagnon) 3/24/73 
Th state also must ever bear in mind ''the safety of the general 
community" Morrisse~ 408 U. S. at 477. 
I 
I 
Rider, A, p. ( Gagnon) 3/9/73 
In view of the tens of thousands of persons or, Jattomkio 
probation and parole, an unbending rule requiring counsel in all 
revocation cases could well impose a requirement which simply 
could n,ot be met. The added increment of cost .. in terms of 
I 
' I 




the1'providing of counsel for the state, the employment of increased 
I 
personnel necessary for the expanded hearings and record keeping -
cert inly would not be insubstantial The more serious problem, 
however, would relate to the availability of enough lawyers to 
accommodate the substantial increase in demand. This problem, 
already acute in view of demands resulting from Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U. s. 335 (1965) and its progeny, caused concern 
among members of the Court (though in m varying degrees) 
I 
in ~r esiEger v. Hamlin, supra, at 37, note 7; concurring opinion 
of Mr. Justice Brennan, at 40, 41; concurring opinion of Chief 
JustJ,ce Burger, at 44; and concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
I I 
i 
P<J!well at 56-61. 
. ,
Rider A, p. (Cagnon) 3/9/73 
Add as a footnote at an appro rlate p~ce: 
The Court's order placing Jlmlllllct respondent on probation 
provided, among other things that "in the event of his failure to 
meet the conditions of his probation he will stand committed under 
th sentence alr ady imposed. " App. 1 O. The greement 
pecifying the conditions of the probation, duly executed by 
respondent, obligated him to "make a sincere attempt to avoid 
all cts which are forbidden by law. " App. 12. 
which the presence of counsel will materially assist the decision-
making agency in ascertaining the relevant facts, and in pointing 
the way to a just result. In between these obvious cases (which, with 
reason, we may hope will encompass the vast majority of all cases), 
there will be a certain number of cases in which the decision will 
be close and fairly arguable whether fundamental fairness requires 
that counsel be provided. A sound discretion must be exercised in 
such cases which should be set aside only when clearly abused. But 
where a timely and colorable claim has been made upon one or more 
of the grounds set forth above, we think that both prudence and justice 
suggest the desirability of resolving the doubt in favor of the pro-
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which the presence of counsel will materially assist the decision-
making agency in ascertaining the relevant facts, and in pointing 
the way to ~ a just result. In between these obvious i,t)OS 
cases (which, with reason, we may hope will encompass the 
number of cases in 9Ve.l'y--,fi#:ate a.Dd fpom time to time in which 
the decision whether to designate counsel is re ired under the ~ 
a,~~~~~~ ~/.W~4'-i 
principle of fund:ament s. ?ere a timely and colorable 
claim has been made upon one or more of the grounds set forth 
above, we think that both prudence and justice suggest the 
desirability of resolving the doubt in favor of the probationer or 
parolee. After all, his liberty is at stake. 
10. 
IV. 
We return to the facts of the present case. Because respondent 
was not afforded either a preliminary hearing or a final hearing, the 
revocation of his probation did not meet the standards of due process 
prescribed in Morrissey. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to a 
writ of habeas corpus. On remand, the District Court should allow 
the State an opportunity to conduct such a hearing. As to whether the 
State must provide counsel, respondent's admission to having committed 
another serious crime creates the very sort of situation in which counsel 
need not ordinarily be provided. But because of respondent's subse-
quent assertions regarding that admission, we conclude that the failure 
of the State Board to provide respondent with the assistance of counsel 
should be reexamined in light bf the views expressed in this opinion. 
The general guidelines outlined above should be applied in the first 
instance by those charged with conducting the revocation hearing .1 
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and respondent was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. On remand, 
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the istrict ourt should allow the State an opportunity to conduct 
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another serious crime creates the very sort of situation in which 
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Mfirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
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4. 
is whether guilt or innocence has been determined in accordance 
with law. 
The probation officer is neither a policeman nor a prose-
cuting attorney. As noted above, his duty to the probationer-- his client -
is on a parity with his duty to society. The parole RBUR and probation ., 
board, likewise, has the primary responsibility for implementing the 
restorative and rehabilitative purposes of the probation/parole system. 
If, as the Court of Appeals held and respondent urges, counsel were 
required in all probation and parole revocation cases, the result would 
be burdensome upon the public for all of the obvious reasons. There 
would be substantial additional cost - of providing free counsel, additional 
la:,r personnel and more records. Also, the inevitable delay, increased 
formality, and uncertainty would change the character of revocation in-
quiriles. More importantly, the result could well be self-defeating even 
to those who believe most ardently - with well-founded justification -
in the merit of liberalized concepts of probation and parole. If these 
heretofore informal and flexible procedures should be converted into 
mini-criminal trials, the battle lines inevitably will be drawn; if counsel 
is provided for the probationer or parolee, the state in turn must provide 
• 
5. 
its own counsel; the proceedings will tend to become formalized and 
adversary in character; lawyers, by training and disposition are in• 
clined to be combative, zealous and bound by the high duty of our pro-
fession to present all available evidence and arguments in support of 
their clients and to contest vigorously all adverse evidence and views; 
and in the hostilities generated by the heat of adversary proceedings, 
parole and probation board may well be forced in many cases by the 
record made public at the hearing to be less tolerant of deviant be-
~/ 
havior and feel MICJeee compelled to re-incarcerate rather than continue 
non-punative rehabilitation. 
We think the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the state 
is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for !:!! indigent pro-
bationers in all revocation cases. Such a rule would have the merit 
of simplicity and ease of application, assuming (perhaps without justi-
fication) that counsel in the requisite numbers would be available and that 
a state could finance the cost. But we find no foundation in the Constitution 
or in reason to extend the "full panoply" of due process right$ to a pro-
bationer or a parolee faced with possible revocation, and Mo~·rissey 
\ 
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expressly so held. Supra It 480. 
In addition to the considerations discussed above, it is 
common knowledge that the issues both of fact and as to the appropriate 
disposition vary atdely and unpredicatably in such hearings. In what may 
well be the typical case, the probationer or parolee will have been con-
victed of committing another crime, or some other violation of the 
conditions of his liberty will have been irrefutably established by 
public record or otherwise, or the individual himself will have admitted 
the charges against him. 5 While in some cases in these categories a 
probationer or parolee may have a satisfactory justification for the 
violation or a meritorious reason why revocation is not the most appro-
priate disposition, amelioratory information of this kind is often not 
susceptible of proof or may be so personal or so simple as not to re-
quire either investigation or exposition by counsel. 
It is well to keep, in mind that we deal here not with the 
right of an accused to count.el in a criminal prosecution, but with the 
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prosecuting attorney. As noted above, his duty to the probationer -
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likewise, has the primary responsibility for implementing the 
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self-defeating even 'f;{'those who believe~ - with well-founded 
justification - in the merit of liberalized concepts of probation and 
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be converted into mini-criminal trials, the battle lines inevitably 
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will be drawn; the proceedings will ex tend to become adversary 
in character; if counsel is provided for the probationer or parolee, 




and disposition are inclined to be combative, zealous and bound 
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by the high duty of our profession to present all available evidence 
in support of their clients and to contest vigorously all adverse 
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evidence; and in the hostilities generated by the heat of adversary 
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judicial officers - may well be forced in many cases by the record 
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ctie,e:pe,tion in favor of continued non-incarcerated rehabilitation. 
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We think the Court of Appeals erred in holding that th state 
is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for 8!'81 indigent 
probationers in all revocation cases. Such a rule would have the 
merit of simplicity and ease of application, assuming (perhaps 
~ 
without justification) that coun~ e r ?quisite num'oorsµ. 
be available and that a state 
foundation in the Constitution or in reason to extend the "full 
panoply" of due process rights to a probationer or a parolee faced 
with possible revocation, and Morrissey expressly so held. Supra 
f .. 
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at 480. In addition to the considerations discussed above, it is 
~ 
common knowledge that the issues both of fact and as to theAMMP 
-
ecisions vary widely and unpredictably in such hearings. In 




-Rtil been convicted of committing another crime, or some other 
t.n.»--,~ 
violation of the conditions of his libertyiles been irrefutably 
'1 
established by public record or atireiv@a. otherwise, or the 
~ 5 
individual himself ~ have admitted the charges against him. 
While in some cases in these categories a probationer or parolee 
may have a satisfactory justification for the violation or a meritorious 
reason why revocation is not the most appropriate disposition, 
amelioratory information of k this kindxhf is often not susceptible 
of proof or may be so personal or so simple as not to require 
D 
either investigation or exposition by counsel. <fl It is well to 
keep in mind that we deal here not with the right of an accused 
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to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with the limited du)\. 
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This case presents the related questions whether a 
previously sentenced probationer is entitled to a hearing 
when his probation is revoked and, if so, whether he is 
entitled to be represented by appointed counsel at such 
a hearing. 
I 
Respondent, Gerald Scarpelli, pleaded guilty in July 
1965, to a charge of armed robbery in Wisconsin. The
1 
trial judge sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment, but 
suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for 
seven years in the custody of the Wisconsin Department 
of Public Welfare ("the Department").1 At that time, 
he signed an agreement specifying the terms of his pro-
bation and a "Travel Permit and Agreement to Return" 
allowing him to reside in Illinois, with supervision there 
1 The Court's order placing respondent on probation provided, 
among other things, that "in the en'nt of his failure to meet the con--
dit,ions of his probation he will stand committed under the sentence 
already imposed. App., p. 10. The agreement specifying the con-
ditions of the probation, duly executed by respondent, obligated him 
to "make a sincere attempt lo avoid all acts which are forbidden by 
law." App., p. 12. 
" 
71-1225-0PINION 
C:AGNON v. SCARPELLI 
under an interstate compact. On August 5, 1965, he 
was accepted for supervision by the Adult Probation De-
partment of Cook County, Illinois. 
On August 6, respondent was apprehended by Illinois 
police, who had surprised him and one Fred Kleckner, 
Jr., in the course of the burglary of a house. After being 
apprised of his constitutional rights, respondent admitted 
that he and Fleckner had broken into the house for the 
purpose of stealing merchandise or money, although he 
now asserts that his statement was made under duress 
and is false. Probation was revoked by the Department 
on September 1, without a hearing. The stated grounds 
for revocation were that: 
"1. [Scarpelli] has associated with known criminals, 
in direct violation of his probation regulations and 
his supervising agent's instructions; 
"2. [Scarpelli] while associating with a known 
criminal, namely, Fred Kleckner, Jr., was involved 
in, and arrested for, a burglary on the evening of 
August 5, 1965 in Deerfield, Illinois." App., p. 20. 
On September 5, 1965, he was incarcerated in the Wis-
consin State Reformatory at Green Bay to begin serving 
the 15 years to which he had been sentenced by the trial 
judge. At no time was he afforded a hearing. 
Some three years later, on December 16, 1968, respond-
ent applied for a writ of habeas corpus. After the peti-
tion had been filed, but before it had been acted upon, 
the Department placed respondent on parole. 2 The Dis-
trict Court found that his status as parolee was sufficient 
custody to confer jurisdiction on the court and that the 
2 Respondent was initially paroled to a federal detainer to serve a 
previously imposed federal sentence arising from another conviction. 
He was sub ·eqncntly releas<'d from federal eu,tody, but remains a 
parolee under the supervision of the Department. 
71-1225-0PINION 
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petition was not moot because the revocation carried 
"collateral consequences," presumably including the re-
straints imposed by his parole. On the merits, the Dis-
trict Court held that revocation without a hearing and 
counsel was a denial of due process. 317 F. Supp. 72 
(ED Wis. 1970). The Court of Appeals affirmed, sub 
nom. Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F. 2d 416 (CA7 1970), and 
we granted certiorari. 408 U. S. 021 ( 1972). 
II 
Two prior decisions set the bounds of our present in-
quiry. In Mernpa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967), the 
Court held that a probationer is entitled to be repre-
sented by appointed counsel at a combined revocation 
and sentencing hearing. Reasoning that counsel is re-
quired "at every stage of a criminal proceeding where 
substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected," 
389 U. S. 134, and that sentencing is one such stage, the 
Court concluded that counsel must be provided an indi-
gent at sentencing even when it is accomplished as part 
of a subsequent, probation revocation proceeding. But 
this line of reasoning does not require a hearing or counsel 
at the time of probation revocation in a case such as the 
present one, where the probationer was sentenced at the 
time of trial. 
Of greater relevance is our decision last Term in Mor--
rissey v. Bre,wer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). There we held 
that the revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal 
prosecution. 
"Parole arises after the end of the criminal prose--
cution, including imposition of sentence. . . . Revo-
cation deprives an individual, not of the absolute 
liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only 
of the conditional liberty properly dependent on 
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Even though the revocation of parole is not a part 
of the criminal prosecution, we held that the loss of 
liberty entailed is a serious deprivation requiring that 
the parolee be accorded due process. Specifically, we 
held that a parolee is entitled to two hearings, one a 
preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and deten-
tion to determine whether there is probable cause to be-
lieve that he has committed a violation of his parole and 
the other a somewhat more comprehensive hearing prior 
to the making of the final revocation decision. 
Petitioner does not contend that there is any differ-
ence relevant to the guarantee of due process between 
the revocation of parole and the revocation of probation, 
nor do we perceive one.~ Probation revocation, like 
parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, 
but does result in a loss of liberty. 4 Accordingly, we hold 
that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a pre-
liminary and a final revocation hearing, under the con-
ditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra.~ 
3 Despite the undoubted minor differences between probation and 
parole, the commentators have agreed that revocation of probation 
where sentence has been imposed previously is constitutionally in-
distinguishable from the revocation of parole. See, e. g., Van Dyke, 
Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 
59 Calif. L. Rev. 1215, 1241-1243 (1971); Sklar, Law and Practice in 
Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. Crim. L. C. P. S. 
175, 198 n. 182 (1964). 
4 It is clear at least after Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, that a 
probationer can no longer be denied due process, in reliance on the 
dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935), that probation 
is an "act of grace." 
5 Petitioner argues in addition that the Morrissey hearing require-
ments impose serious practical problems in cases such as the present 
one in which a probationer or parollee is allowed to leave the con-
victing State for supervision in another State. Such arrangements 
are made pursuant to an interstate compact adopted by all of the 
States, including Wisconsin. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 57.13. Petitioner's 
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III 
The second, and more difficult, question posed by this 
case is whether an indigent probationer or parolee has a 
due process right to be represented by appointed counsel 
at these hearings.6 In answering that question, we draw 
heavily on the opinion in Morrissey. Our first point of 
reference is the character of probation or parole. As 
noted in Morrissey regarding parole, the "purpose is to 
help individuals reintegrate into society as soon as they 
brief asserts that as of June 30, 1972, Wi~consin had a total of 642 
parolees and probationers under supervision in other States and that 
incomplete statistics as of January 1972 indicated a national total 
of 24,693 persons under out-of-state supervision. Petitioner's Brief, 
pp. 21-22. 
Some amount of disruption inevitably attends any new constitu-
tional ruling, and we are confident that modification of the inter-
state compact can remove without undue strain any technical hurdles 
to compliance with Morrissey. However, an additional comment is 
warranted with respect to the rights to present witnesses and to 
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Petitioner's greatest 
concern is with the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from 
perhaps thousands of miles away. While in some cases there is 
simply no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that 
we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate 
of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits, 
depositions, and documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to fore-
close the States from holding both the preliminary and the final hear-
ings at the place of violation or from developing other creative solu-
tions to the practical difficulties of the Morrissey requirements. 
0 In Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, we left open the question "whether 
the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to 
appointed counsel if he is indigent." 408 U. S., at 489. Since 
respondent did not attempt to retain counsel but asked only for 
appointed counsel, we have no occasion to decide in this case whether 
a probationer or parolee has a right to be represented at a revoca-
tion hearing by retained counsel in situations other than those where 
the State would be obliged to furnish counsel for an indigent. 
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are able .... " 408 U. S., at 477. The duty and attitude 
of the probation or parole officer reflect this purpose: 
"While the parole or probation officer recognizes 
his double duty to the welfare of his clients and to 
the safety of the general community, by and large 
concern for the client dominates his professional at-
titude. The parole agent ordinarily defines his role 
as represeuting his client's best interests as long as 
these do not constitute a threat to public safety." 7 
Because the probation or parole officer's function is not 
so much to compel conformance to a strict code of be-
havior as to supervise a course of rehabilitation, he has 
been entrusted traditionally with broad discretion to 
judge the progress of rehabilitation in individual cases, 
and has been armed with the power to recommend or 
even to declare revocation. 
In Morrissey, we recognized that the revocation de-
cision has two analytically distinct components: 
"The first step in a revocation decision involves a 
wholly retrospective factual question: whether the 
parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or more 
conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined 
that the parolee did violate the conditions does the 
second question arise: should the parolee be recom-
mitted to prison or should other steps be taken to 
protect society and improve chances of rehabilita-
tion?" Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at 
479-480.8 
7 RC'mington, l\"ewman, Kimball, MC'lli & Gokbtein, Criminal ,Jus-
tice Admini,tration, l\InterialH and Ca~es 910-911 (1969). 
8 The factor-· entering into these dcci.;ion~ rdate in major part to 
a professional evaluation, by traiued probation nnd parole officers, 
as to the OYC1'all social readju8tment of the offender in the com-
munity, and include consideration of such variables as the offender's 
relationship toward his family, his attitude toward thC' f'ulfillmC'nt 
71-1225-0PINION 
GAGNON v. SCARPELLI 7 
The parole officer's attitude toward these decisions reflects 
the rehabilitative rather than punitive focus of the pro-
bation/parole system: 
"Revocation ... is, if anything, commonly treated 
as a failure of supervision. While presumably it 
\\"ould be inappropriate for a field agent never to 
revoke, the whole thrust of the probation-parole 
movement is to keep men in the c01mnunity, work-
ing with adjustment problems there, and using revo-
cation only as a last resort when treatment has 
failed or is about to fail." 0 
But an exclusive focus on the benevolent attitudes of 
those who administer the probation/parole system when 
it is working successfully obscures the modification in 
attitude which is likely to take place once the officer has 
decided to recommend revocation. Even though the 
officer is not by this recommendation converted into a 
prosecutor committed to convict, his role as counsellor to 
the probationer or parolee is surely undermined. 
"\Vhen the officer's view of the probationer's or parolee's 
conduct differs in this fundamental way from the latter's 
own view, due process requires that the difference be 
resolved before revocation becomes final. Both the pro-
of financial obligations, the extent of his coopera1ion with the pro-
bation officer assigned to his case, his per~onal associations, and-
of course-whether 1here have been specific and ,;ignifirant violations 
of the conditions of the probation. The importance of these con-
siderations, some factual and others entirely judgmeutal, is illrn,t.rated 
by a \Viscon,,in empirical study which disclosed that some "twenty-
fiye percent of the offenders studied [on probation or parole] who 
committed new offenses were [nevertheless-I continued on firld 
supervision .... " S. Hunt, The Revocation Derision: A Study 
of Probation and Parole Agrnt's Discretion (unpublishrd thrsis on 
file at the library of the University of Wisconsin) (196-±), cited in 
Petitioner's Brief, Addrndum, p. 106. 
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bationer or parolee and the State have interests in the 
accurate finding of fact and the informed use of discre-
tion, the probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty 
is not unjustifiably taken away and the State to make 
certain that it is not unnecessarily interrupting a success-
ful effort at rehabilitation. The State also must ever 
bear in mind "the safety of the general community." 
Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at 477. 
It was to serve all of these interests that Morrissey 
mandated preliminary and final revocation hearings. At 
the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is en-
titled to notice of the alleged violations of probation or 
parole, an opportunity to appear and to present evidence 
in his own behalf, a conditional right to confront ad-
verse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and a 
written report of the hearing. Morrissey v. Brewer; 
supra, 408 U. S., at 487. The final hearing is a less sum-
mary one because the decision under consideration is the 
ultimate decision to revoke rather than a mere determi-
nation of probable cause, but the "minimum requirements 
of due process" include very similar elements: 
" (a) written notice of the claimed violations of 
[probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the ·[pro-
bationer or] parolee of evidence against him; ( c) op-
portunity to be heard in person and to present 
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right 
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses ( un-
less the hearing officer specifically finds good cause 
for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and 
detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole 
board, members of which need not be judicial officers 
or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the fact~ 
finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking [probation or] parole." M orrissery v. 
Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at 489. 
'· 
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These requirements in themselves serve as substantial 
protection against ill-considered revocation, and peti-
tioner argues that counsel need never be supplied. What 
this argument overlooks is that the effectiveness of the 
rights guaranteed by Morrissey may in some circum-
stances depend on the use of skills which the probationer 
or parolee is unlikely to possess. Despite the informal 
nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical 
rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or unedu-
cated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in 
presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the 
presentation requires the examining or cross-examining 
of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex doc-
umentary evidence. 
By the same token, we think that the Court of Ap-
peals erred in accepting respondent's contention that the 
State is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel 
for indigents in all probation or parole revocation cases. 
While such a rule has the appeal of simplicity, it would 
impose direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages 
without regard to the need or the likelihood in a par-
ticular case for a constructive contribution by counsel.. 
In most cases, the probationer or parolee has been con-
victed of committing another crime or has admitted the 
charges against him.10 And while in some cases he 
may have a justifiable excuse for the violation or a con-
vincing reason why revocation is not the appropriate 
disposition, mitigating evidence of this kind is often not 
susceptible of proof or is so simple as not to require either 
investigation or exposition by counsel. 
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceed-
ing will all but inevitably alter significantly the nature of 
the proceeding. If counsel is provided for the proba-
10 See Sklar, supra, n. 3, at 192 (parole), 193 (probation). 
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tioner or parolee, the State in turn will normally provide 
its own counsel; lawyers, by training and disposition , are 
inclined to be combative, zealous and bound by the high 
sense of duty of our profession to present all available 
evidence and argume11ts in support of their clients' po-
sitions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence 
and views. The role of the hearing body itself, aptly 
described in Morrissey as being "predictive and discre-
tionary" as well as factfinding, may become more akin 
to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the 
rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or 
parolee. In the greater self-consciousness of its quasi-
judicial role, the hearing body may be less tolerant of 
marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to 
reincarcerate rather than continue nonpunitive rehabili-
tation. Certainly, the decisionmaking process will be 
prolonged, and the financial cost to the State-for ap-
pointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record, 
and the possibility of judicial review-will not be 
insubstantial.11 
In some cases, these modifications in the nature of the 
revocation hearing must be endured and the costs borne 
because, as we have indicated above, the probationer's or 
11 The scope of the practical problem which wo11lct be orcasionrd 
by a requirement of roun~ol in all revocation cnses is suggest ed by 
the fo ct that in the mid-19GO's there were an es1 imated tl\-cragr of 
20,000 adult felon~· parole reYorations nnd 108,000 adult probation 
rc\"OcutionR each year. President's Commission on Law Enforre-
mrnt :md Administration of Justirc, T ask Forro Report: The Courts 
56 n. 28 (1907) . The problem of the arnilability of lnw~rers, alrendy 
nrut e in d ew of demands resulting from Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1965), nncl i1 s progcn~r, r:m s0d ronrern among mem-
bers of the Court (though in rnrying degree~) in Argersinger v. Ilam-
lin. 407 U.S. 25, 37 n. 7 (1972) (opinion of the Court); conrmring 
opinion of MH. ,JuS'l'ICE BREN NAN , id. , at 40, 41; C'OIH'UTTing opinion 
of l\1'R. CHTEF .Tuwr1cE Bmwim., id., nt 4-1 ; and ron rurring opinion 
of l\'IR. Jus'l'ICE Po1l'ELL, id., at 5G- Gl. 
'• 
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parolee's version of a disputed issue can fairly be repre-
seJlted only by a trained advocate. But due process is 
not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in 
informality, flexibility, and economy must always be 
sacrificed. 
In so concluding, we are of course aware that the case-
by-case approach to the right to counsel in felony prosecu-
tions adopted in Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), 
was later rejected in favor of a per se rule in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). See also Argersinger 
v. Handin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972). We do not, however, 
draw from Gideon and Argersinger the conclusion that a 
case-by-case approach to furnishing counsel is necessarily 
inadequate to protect constitutional rights asserted in 
varying types of proceedings: there are critical differences 
between criminal trials and probation or parole revoca-
tion hearings, and the probationer and parolee as well 
as society have an interest in preserving these differences. 
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a pros-
ecutor; formal rules of evide11ce are in force; a defendant 
enjoys a number of procedural rights which may be lost 
if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial, a defendant 
must make a presentation understandable to untrained 
jurors. In short, a criminal trial under our system is 
an adversary proceeding with its own unique character-
istics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the 
State is represented not by a prosecutor but by a parole 
officer with the orientation described above; formal pro-
cedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and 
the members of the hearing body are familiar with the 
problems and practice of probation or parole. The need 
for counsel at revocation hearings derives not from the· 
invariable attributes of those hearings but rather from 
the peculiarities of particular cases. 
The differences between a criminal (tal and a revoca-
tion hearing do not dispose altogether of the argument 
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that under a case-by-case approach there may be cases 
in which a lawyer would be useful but in which none 
would be appointed because an arguable defense would 
be uncovered only by a lawyer. Without denying that 
there is some force in this argument, we think it a suffi-
cient answer that we deal here not with the right of an 
accused to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with 
the more limited due process right of one who is a pro-
bationer or parolee only because he has been convicted 
of a crime.12 
We thus find no justification for a new inflexible con-
stitutional rule with respect to the requirement of coun-
sel. We think, rather, that the decision as to the need 
for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the 
exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority 
charged with responsibility for administering the proba-
tion and parole system. Although the presence and par-
ticipation of counsel in the great majority of revocation 
hearings will probably be both undesirable and constitu-
tionally unnecessary, there will remain certain cases in 
,:vhich fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due proc-
ess-will require that the State provide at its expense 
counsel for indigent probationers or parolees. 
It is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formu-
late a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed 
in determining when the providing of counsel is neces-
sary to meet the applicable due process requirements. 
The facts and circumstances of these cases are susceptible 
to almost infinite variation, and a considerable discretion 
12 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967) , establishing a juvenile's 
right to appointed counsel in a delinquency proceeding whieh while 
denominated civil was functionally akin to a criminal trial. A 
juvenile charged with violation of a generally applicable tatute is 
differently situated from an alrcad~·-convictcd probationer or parolee, 
and i8 entitled to a higher degree of protection. See In re Winship, 
397 U. S. 35 (1970) (the standard of proof in a juvenile delinquency 
proceeding must be "proof beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
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must be allowed the responsible agency in making the 
decision. Presumptively, it may be said that counsel 
should be provided in cases where the probationer or 
parolee makes a timely and colorable claim (i) that he 
has not committed the alleged violation of the condi-
tions upon which he is a.t liberty; or (ii) that, even if 
the violation is a matter of public record or is uncon-
tested, there are substantial reasons which justified or 
mitigated the violation and make revocation inappro-
priate. In passing on a request for the appointment of 
counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, 
especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer ap-
pears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. 
In every case in which a request for counsel is refused, 
the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in 
the record. 
IV 
We return to the facts of the present case. Because 
respondent was not afforded either a preliminary hear-
ing or a final hearing, the revocation of his probation did 
not meet the standards of due process prescribed in 
Morrissey. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to a 
writ of habeas corpus. On remand, the District Court 
should allow the State an opportunity to conduct such 
a hearing. As to whether the State must provide coun-
sel, respondent's admission to having committed another 
serious crime creates the very sort of situation in which 
counsel need not ordinarily be provided. But because of 
respondent's subsequent assertions regarding that admis-
sion, we conclude that the failure of the Department 
to provide respondent with the assistance of counsel 
should be re-examined in light of this opinion. The 
general guidelines outlined above should be applied in 
the first instance by those charged with conducting the 
revocation hearing. 
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This case presents the related questions whether a 
previously sentenced probationer is entitled to a hearing 
when his probation is revoked and, if so, whether he is 
entitled to be represented by appointed counsel at such 
a hearing. 
I 
Respondent, Gerald Scarpelli, pleaded guilty in July, 
1965, to a charge of armed robbery in Wisconsin. The 
trial judge sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment, but 
suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for 
seven years in the custody of the Wisconsin Department 
of Public Welfare ("the Department").1 At that time, 
he signed an agreement specifying the terms of his pro-
bation and a "Travel Permit and Agreement to Return" 
allowing him to reside in Illinois, with supervision there 
'The Court's order placing respondent on probation provided, 
among other things, that "[i]n the e,·ent of his failure to meet the con-
ditions of his probation he will stand committed under the sentence 
all ready [sic] imposed." App., p. 10. The agreement specifying 
the conditions of the probation, duly executed by respondent, obli-
gaicd him to "mnke a sincere ~1ttempt to avoid all acts which are 
forbidden by law .... " App., p. 12. 
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under an interstate compact. On August 5, 1965, he 
was accepted for supervision by the Adult Probation De-
partment of Cook County, Illinois. 
On August 6, respondent was apprehended by Illinois 
police, who had surprised him and 011e Fred Kleckner, 
Jr., in the course of the burglary of a house. After being 
apprised of his constitutional rights, respondent admitted 
that he and Fleckner had broken into the house for the 
purpose of stealing merchandise or money, although he 
now asserts that his statement was made under duress 
and is false. Probation was revoked by the Wisconsin 
Department on September 1, without a hearing. The 
stntecl grounds for revocation were that: 
"1. [Scarpellil has associated with known criminals, 
in direct violation of his probation regulations and 
his supervising agent's instructions; 
"2. [Scarpelli] while associating with a known 
criminal, namely Fred Kleckner, Jr., was involved 
in, and arrested for, a burglary ... in Deerfield, 
Illinois." App., p. 20. 
On September 4, Hl65, he was incarcerated in the Wis-
consin State Reformatory at Green Bay to begin serving 
the 15 years to "·hich he had been sentenced by the trial 
judge. At no time "·as he afforded a hearing. 
Some three years later, on December 16, Hl68, respond-
ent applied for a writ of habeas corpus. After the peti-
tion had been filed. but before it had been acted upon, 
the Department placed respondent on parole." The Dis-
trict Court found that his status as parolee was sufficient 
custody to confer jurisdiction on the court and that the 
"He::,pondenl was initially paroled to a federal dctninN to ~eryc a 
prc,·iously imposPd federal sentenrc n ri~ing from ano1 hrr rom·irt ion. 
He was ,-ub8eq11entl_,· relra~rd from frdcrnl ru~tody, but rrmains a 
pnrolrc under the supcn·ision of the Department. 
~-
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petition ,,·as not moot because the revocation carried 
"collateral consequences," presumably including the re-
straints imposed by his parole. On the merits, the Dis-
trict, Court hrld that revocation without a hearing and 
counsel was a denial of due process. 317 F. Supp. 72 
(ED Wis. 1970). The Court of Appeals affirmed, sub 
nom. Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F. 2d 416 (CA7 1971), and 
we granted certiorari. 408 U. S. 021 (1972). 
II 
Two prior decisions set the bounds of our present in-
quiry. In Mempa v. Rhay, 380 U. S. 128 (1967), the-
Court held that a probationer is entitled to be repre-
sented by appointed counsel at a combined revocation 
and sentencing hearing. Reasoning that counsel is re-
quired "at every stage of a criminal proceeding where 
substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected," 
389 U.S., at 134, and that sentencing is one such stage, the 
Court concluded that counsel must be provided an incli-
gent at sentencing even "·hen it is accomplished as part 
of a subsequent, probation revocation proceeding. But 
this line of reasoning docs not require a hearing or counsel 
at the time of probation revocation in a case such as the 
present one, where the probationer ,vas sentenced at the 
time of trial. 
Of greater relevance is our decision last Term in Mor-
rissey v. Bre,wer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). There we held 
that the revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal 
prosecution. 
"Parole arises after the encl of the criminal prose-
cution, including imposition of sentence. . . . Revo-
cation deprives an individual, not of the absolute· 
liberty to ,Yhich every citizen is entitled, but only 
of the conditional liberty properly dependent on 
observance of special parole restrictions." 408 U. S., 
at 480. 
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Even though the revocation of parole is not a part 
of the criminal prosecution, we held that the loss of 
liberty entailed is a serious deprivation requiring that 
the parolee be accorded clue process. Specifically, we 
held that a parolee is entitled to two hearings, one a 
preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and deten-
tion to determine whether there is probable cause to be-
lieve that he has committed a violation of his parole and 
the other a somewhat more comprehensive hearing prior 
to the making of the final revocation decision. 
Petitioner does not contend that there is any differ-
ence relevant to the guarantee of due process between 
the revocation of parole and the revocation of probation, 
nor do we perceive one.3 Probation revocation, like 
parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, 
but does result in a loss of liberty. 4 Accordingly, we hold 
that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a pre-
liminary and a final revocation hearing, under the con-
ditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra." 
3 Despite the undoubted minor differences between probation and 
parole, the commentators have agreed that revocation of probation 
where sentence has been imposed previously is constitutionally in-
distinguishable from the revocation of parole. See, e. g., Van Dyke, 
Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 
59 Calif. L. Rev. 1215, 1241-1243 (1971); Sklar, Law and Practice in 
Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. Crim. L. C. & 
P. S. 175, 198 n. 182 (1964). 
4 It is clear at least after Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, that a 
probationer can no longer be denied due process, in reliance on the 
dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490,492 (1935), that probation 
is an "act of grace." 
5 Petitioner argues in addition that the Morrissey hcariuf; require-
ments impose serious practical problems in cases such as the present 
onr in which a probationer or parollcc is allowed to leave the con-
Yicting State for supcn·ision in another State. Such arrangements 
arc made pursuant to an interstate compact adopted by all of the 
States, including Wiscon~in. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 57.13. Petitioner's 
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III 
The second, and more difficult, question posed by this 
case is whether an indigent probationer or parolee has a 
due process right to be represented by appointed counsel 
at these hearings.0 In answering that question, we draw 
heavily on the opinion in Morrissey. Our first point of 
refere11ce is the character of probation or parole. As 
noted in Morrissey regarding parole, the "purpose is to 
help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive 
individuals as soon as they are able .... " 408 U. S., at 
brief asserts that as of June 30, 1972, Wisconsin had a total of 642 
parolees and probationers under supervision in other States and that 
incomplete statistics as of June 30, 1971, indicated a national total 
of 24,693 persons under out-of-state supervision. Petitioner',; Brief, 
pp. 21-22. 
Some amount of disruption inevitably attends any new constitu-
tional ruling, and we are confident that modification of the inter--
state compact can remove without undue strain any technical hurdles 
to compliance with Morrissey. However, an additional commmt is 
warr:rnted with respect to the rights to present witnesses and to 
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Petitioner's greatest 
concern is with the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from 
perhaps thousands of miles away. While in some cases there is 
simply no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that 
we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate 
of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits, 
depositions, and documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to fore-
close the States from holding both the preliminary and the final hear-
ings at the place of violation or from developing other creative solu-
tions to the practical difficulties of the Morrissey requirements. 
0 In Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, we left open the question "whether 
the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to 
appointed counsel if he is indigent." 408 U. S., at 489. Since 
respondent did not attempt to retain counsel but asked only for 
appointed counsel, we have no occasion to decide in thi::; case whether 
a probationer or parolee has a right to be represented at a rernca-
tion hearing by retained counsel in situations other than those where 
the State would be obliged to furnish counsel for an indigent. 
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477. The duty a11cl attitude of the probation or parole 
officer reflect this purpose: 
"While the parole or probation officer recognizes 
his double duty to the welfare of his clients and to 
the safety of the general community, by and large 
concern for the client dominates his professional at-
titude. The parole agent ordinarily defines his role 
as representing his client's best interests as long as 
these do not constitute a threat to public safety." 1 
Because the probation or parole officer's function is not 
so much to compel conformance to a strict code of be-
havior as to supervise a course of rehabilitation, he has 
been entrusted traditionally with broad discretion to 
judge the progress of rehabilitation in individual cases, 
and has been armed with the power to recommend or 
even to declare revocation. 
In JJ1 orrissey, we recognized that the revocation de-
cision has two analytically distinct components: 
"The first step in a revocation decision involves a 
wholly retrospective factual question: whether the 
parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or more 
conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined 
that the parolee did violate the conditions does the 
second question arise: should the parolee be recom-
mitted to prison or should other steps be taken to 
protect society and improve chances of rehabilita-
tion?" J.l1 orrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at 
479-480.8 
7 Remington, Newman, Kimball, l\Ielli & Gold,lein, Crimin.ii .Jus-
tice Administration, l\Talerial~ and Ca,e~ 910-Dll (1969). 
8 The fartor~ entering into these dcci~ion~ rrlate i11 mnjor part to 
a profc~~ional eYnl11ntion , h)· trninrcl probation or parole officers, 
as to the overall sorial readj11,1ment of the offr11der in the rom-
munit~·, nnd include consideration of such n1riables as the offrndcr's 
rcbtion:;hip toward his family, hi~ attitude toward the fulfillment 
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The parole officer's attitude toward these decisions reflects 
the rehabilitative rather than punitive focus of the pro-
bation/ parole systern: 
"Revocation ... is, if anything, commonly treated 
as a failure of supervision. While presumably it 
,rnuld be inappropriate for a field agent never to 
revoke, the whole thrust of the probation-parole 
movement is to keep men in the community, work-
ing ,Yith adjustment problems there, and using revo-
cation only as a last resort "·hen treatment has 
failed or is about to fail." u 
But an exclusive focus on the benevolent attitudes of 
those who administer the probation/ parole system when 
it is ,rnrking successfully obscures the modification in 
attitude which is likely to take place once the officer has 
decided to recommend revocation. Even though the 
officer is not by this recommendation converted into a 
prosecutor committed to convict, his role as counsellor to 
the probationer or paro]re is surely undermined. 
·when the officer's view of the probationer's or parolee's 
conduct differs in this fundamental way from the latter's 
o,Yn vie"·, due proce~s requires that the difference be 
resolved before revocation becomes final. Both the pro-
of financial obligations, 1 he rxlrnt of hi~ coopcrat ion wi1 h the pro-
bation ofliecr a~::;igncd to his ra"r, his pcr,011111 assoC'iat ions, :md-
of romsr-whrthcr there have brrn spreifir :rnd ~ignificant violations 
of thr conditions of the probation. Thr importance of t hr,c con-
sidrrations, f'Oll1C factual nnd other;; rntirrl)' judgmental , is illustrated 
by a \Vi,,;rornin cmpiricnl ::;tudy which cli:,;rlosrcl that some ·1twrnty-
fi1·r prrcr nt of the offrndrrs stuclird [on prob:ttion or parolr] who 
eommittrcl nrw offcnsr;:; wrrc [ncYcrthclrss ·1 rontinurd on firlcl 
st1pr1Tision .... " S. Hunt, The RcYoc-alion Dcci:;ion: .\ Stmly 
of Probation and Parolr Agrnt'~ Di~rrct ion (unpubli~hrcl tlw~is on 
filr at thr librnr)' of thr Uniwr~it.1· of "'\Yi~ron~in) (196+) , citrd in 
Pct itionrr's Brirf, Aclclr11dnm, p. lOG. 
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bationer or parolee and the State ha,·e interests in the 
accurate finding of fact and the informed use of discre-
tion, the probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty 
is not unjustifiably taken away and the State to make 
certain that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a suc-
cessful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudic-
ing the safety of the community. 
It was to serve all of these interests that Morrissey 
mandated preliminary and final revocation hearings. At 
the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is en-
titled to notice of the alleged violations of probation or 
parole, an opportunity to appear and to present evidence 
in his own behalf, a conditional right to confront ad-
verse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and a 
written report of the hearing. Morrissey v. Brewer, 
supra, 408 U. S., at 487. The final hearing is a less sum-
mary one because the decision under consideration is the 
ultimate decision to revoke rather than a mere determi-
nation of probable cause, but the "minimum requirements 
of clue process'' include very similar elements: 
"(a) written notice of the claimed violations of 
[probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [ pro-
bationer or] parolee of evidence against him; ( c) op-
portunity to be heard in person and to present 
witnesses and documentary evidence; ( cl) the right 
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (un-
less the hearing officer specifically finds good cause 
for not allowing confrontation); ( e) a 'neutral and 
detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole 
board, members of which need not be judicial officers 
or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the fact-
finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking [probation or] parole." M orrissery v. 
Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at 489. 
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These requirements in themselves serve as substantial 
protection against ill-considered revocation, and peti-
tioner argues that counsel need never be supplied. What 
this argument overlooks is that the effectiveness of the 
rights guaranteed by Morrissey may in some circum-
stances depend on the use of skills which the probationer 
or parolee is unlikely to possess. Despite the informal 
nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical 
rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or unedu-
cated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in 
presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the 
presentation requires the examining or cross-examining 
of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex doc-
umentary evidence. 
By the same token, we think that the Court of Ap-
peals erred in accepting respondent's contention that the 
State is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel 
for indigents in all probation or parole revocation cases. 
While such a rule has the appeal of simplicity, it would 
impose direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages 
without regard to the need or the likelihood in a par-
ticular case for a constructive contribution by counsel. 
In most cases, the probationer or parolee has been con-
victed of committing another crime or has admitted the· 
charges against him.10 And while in some cases he 
may have a justifiable excuse for the violation or a. con-
vincing reason why revocation is not the appropriate· 
disposition, mitigating evidence of this kind is of ten not 
susceptible of proof or is so simple as not to require either 
investigation or exposition by counsel. 
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceed-
ing will alter significantly the nature of the proceeding. 
If counsel is provided for the probationer or parolee, the· 
10 See Sklar, supra, n. 3, at 192 (parole), 193 (probation) . 
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State in turn " ·ill nonnally provide its own counsel; 
lawyers, by training and disposition, are advocates and 
bound by professional duty to present all available evi-
dence and arguments in support of their clients' po-
sitions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence 
and views. The role of the hearing body itself, aptly 
described in Morrissey as being "predictive and discre-
tionary" as well as factfincling, may become more akin 
to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the 
rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or 
parolee. In the greater self-eonsciousness of its quasi-
judicial role, the hearing body may be less tolerant of 
marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to 
reincarcerate rather than continue nonpunitive rehabili-
tation. Certainly, the dccisionrnaking process will be 
prolonged, and the financial cost to the State-for ap-
pointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record, 
and the possibility of judicial review-will not be 
insubstantial. 11 
In some cases, these modifications in the nature of the 
revocation hearing must be endured and the costs borne 
because, as we have indicated above, the probationer's or 
parolee's version of a disputed issue can fairly be repre-
sented only by a trained advocate. But due process is 
not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in 
informality, flexibility, and economy must alwa.ys be 
sacrificed. 
In so concluding, we arc of course a,rnre that the case-
by-case ariproach to the right to counsel in felony prosecu-
11 Thr ;.:copr of the praetiral problrm whiC"h would br oec·:1~io1wd 
br a requirrmrnt of c·oun,rl in :1 II rrrnr:1tio11 ca~es is "ugge,trd by 
the fact that in the mid-19G0's therr ,1·c•rr an rstimn1rd a1·rrage of 
20,000 adult frlon~· parnle rr, oration" and 108.000 adult prnhat ion 
rcYora t ions each ~·rar. l'rrsidr11t 's Comm is~ion on Law Fn l'orrc-
mrnt. nncl Aclmini~trntion of .T11~fi<'<'. Ta,.:k Force Rc•port: The Comts 
5G n . 28 (1967). 
• I 
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tions adopted in Betts v. Bra.dy, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), 
was later rejected in favor of a per se rule in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). See also Argersinger 
v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972). We do not, however, 
draw from Gideon and Argersi11ger the conclusion that a 
case-by-case approach to furnishing counsel is necessarily 
inadequate to protect constitutional rights asserted in 
varying types of proceedings: there are critical differences 
between criminal trials and probation or parole revoca-
tion hearings, and both society and the probationer or 
parolee have stakes in preserving these differences. 
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a pros-
ecutor; formal rules of evidence are in force; a defendant 
enjoys a number of procedural rights which may be lost 
if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial, a defendant 
must make a presentation understandable to untrained 
jurors. In short, a criminal trial under our system is 
an adversary proceeding with its ov,;n unique character-
istics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the 
State is represented not by a prosecutor but by a parole 
officer with the orientation described above; formal pro-
cedures and rules of evidence arc not employed; and 
the members of the hearing body are familiar with the 
problems and practice of probation or parole. The need 
for counsel at revocation hearings derives not from the 
invariable attributes of those hearings but rather from 
the peculiarities of particular cases. 
The differences between a criminal trial and a revoca-
tion hearing do not dispose altogether of the argument 
that under a case-by-case approach there may be cases 
in which a lawyer would be useful but in ,vhich none 
would be appointed because an arguable defense would 
be uncovered only by a lawyer. Without denying that 
there is some force in this argument. we think it a suffi-. 
cient answer that we deal here not with the right of an 
accused to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with 
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the more limited due process right of one who is a pro-
bationer or parolee only because he has been convicted 
of a crime.12 
We thus find no justification for a new inflexible con-
stitutional rule v.:ith respect to the requirement of coun-
sel. We think, rather, that the decision as to the need 
for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the 
exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority 
charged with responsibility for administering the proba-
tion and parole system. Although the presence and par-
ticipation of counsel will probably be both undesirable 
and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hear-
ings, there will remain certain cases in which fundamental 
fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require that 
the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent pro-
bationers or parolees. 
It is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formu-
late a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed 
in determining ·when the providing of counsel is neces-
sary to meet the applicable due process requirements. 
The facts and circumstances in preliminary and final 
hearings are susceptible of almost infinite variation , and 
a considerable discretion must be allowed the responsible 
agency in making the decision. Presumptively, it may 
be said that counsel should be provided in cases where, 
after being informed of his right to request counsel, the 
probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on 
a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not com-
12 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) , establishing a juvenile's 
right to appointed counsel in a delinquency proceeding which while 
denominated civil was fun ctionally akin to a crimiml trial. A 
juvenile charged with violation of a generally applicable statute is 
differently situated from rm already-convicted probationer or pnrolrc, 
and is entitled to n higher degree of protection. Sec In re Winship, 
397 U. S. 358 (1970) (the standnrd of proof in a juvenile delinquency 
proceeding must be "proof beyond a reasonable do11bt"). 
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mitted the alleged violation of the conditions upon which 
he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a 
matter of public record or is uncontested, there are sub-
stantial reasons which justified or mitigated the viola-
tion and make revocation inappropriate and that the 
reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or 
present. In passing on a request for the appointment of 
counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, 
especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer ap-
pears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. 
In every case in which a request for counsel at a pre-
liminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for re-
fusal should be stated succinctly in the record. 
IV 
We return to the facts of the present case. Because 
respondent was not afforded either a preliminary hear-
ing or a final hearing, the revocation of his probation did 
not meet the standards of due process prescribed in 
Morrissey, which we have here held applicable to proba-
tion revocations. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to 
a writ of habeas corpus. On remand, the District Court 
should allow the State an opportunity to conduct such 
a hearing. As to whether the State must provide coun-
sel, respondent's admission to having committed another 
serious crime creates the very sort of situation in which 
counsel need not ordinarily be provided. But because of 
respondent's subsequent assertions regarding that admis-
sion, see p. 2, ante, we conclude that the failure of the 
Department to provide respondent with the assistance 
of counsel should be re-examined in light of this opinion. 
The general guidelines outlined above should be applied 
in the first instance by those charged with conducting the 
revocation hearing. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded .. 
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This case presents the related questions whether a 
previously sentenced probationer is entitled to a hearing 
when his probation is revoked and, if so, whether he is 
entitled to be represented by appointed counsel at such 
a hearing. 
I 
Respondent, Gerald Scarpelli, pleaded guilty in July, 
1965, to a charge of armed robberyin Wisconsin. The 
trial judge sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment, but 
suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for 
seven years in the custody of the Wisconsin Department 
of Public Welfare ("the Department").1 At that time, 
he signed an agreement specifying the terms of his pro-
bation and a "Travel Permit and Agreement to Return" 
allowing him to reside in Illinois, with supervision there 
1 The Court's order placing respondent on probation provided, 
among other things, that "[i]n the event of his failure to meet the con-
ditions of his probation he will stand committed under the sentence 
all ready [sic] imposed." App., p. 10. The agreement specifying 
the conditions of the probation, duly executed by re8pondent, obli-
gatrd him to "make a sincere attempt to avoid all acts which are 
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under an interstate compact. On August 5, 1965, he 
,ms accepted for supervision by tho Adult Probation De-
partment of Cook County, Illinois. 
On August 6, respondent was apprehended by Illinois 
police, who had surprised him and one Fred Kleckner, 
Jr., in the course of the burglary of a house. After being 
apprised of his constitutional rights, respondent admitted 
that he and Flcckner had broken into the house for the 
purpose of stealing merchandise or money, although he 
now asserts that his statement was made under duress 
and is false. Probation was revoked by the Wisconsin 
Department on September 1, without a hearing. The 
stated grounds for revocation were that: 
"1. [Scarpelli] has associated with known criminals, 
in direct violation of his probation regulations and 
his supervising agent's instructions; 
"2. f Scarpelli] while associating with a known 
crirn.inal, namely Fred Kleckner, Jr., was involved 
in, and arrested for, a burglary ... in Deerfield, 
Illinois." App., p. 20. 
On September 4, 1065, ho was incarcerated in the Wis-
consin State Reformatory at Green Bay to begin serving 
the 15 years to which he had been sentenced by the trial 
judge. At no time was he afforded a hearing. 
Somo three years later. on December 16, 1968, respond-
ent applied for a writ of habeas corpus. After the peti-
tion had been filed, but before it had been acted upon, 
tho D0partment placed respondent on parole." The Dis-
trict Court found that his status as parolee was sufficient 
custody to confer jurisdiction on the court and that the 
"Rr8pondrnt wa8 initial!,\· parolrd to a frdrral drtainN to ~C'J'\'C a 
prcYiou~ly imposrcl ff•drr::tl ~rntpnrc ari~inµ; from anothrr eorn·irtion. 
Ile w::is subscriuentl~· released from federal ru~tody , but remain, a 
parolee under the supen·i~io11 of 1 hr Drpartment. 
., 
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petition was not moot because the revocation carried 
"collateral consequences," presumably including the re-
straints imposed by his parole. On the merits, the Dis-
trict Court held that revocation without a hearing and 
counsel ,ms a denial of due process. 317 F. Supp. 72 
(ED Wis. 1970). The Court of Appeals affirmed, sub 
nom. Gw1solus Y. Gagnon, 454 F. 2d 416 (CA7 1971), and 
we granted certiorari. 408 U. S. 921 (1972). 
II 
Two prior drcisions set the bounds of our present in-
quiry. In Mcmpa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967) , the 
Court held that a probationrr is entitled to be repre-
sented by appointed counsel at a combined revocation 
and sentenci11g hearing. Reasoning that counsel is re-
quired "at every stage of a criminal proceeding where , 
substantial rights of a, criminal accused may be affected," 
389 U.S., at 134, and that sentencing is one such stage, the 
Court concluded that counf"el must be provided an indi-
gent at sentencing even when it is accomplished as part 
of a subsequent, probation revocation proceeding. But 
this line of reasoning docs not require a hearing or counsel 
at the time of probation revocation in a case such as the 
present one, where the probationer was sentenced at the 
timr of trial. 
Of greater relevance is our decision last Term i11 Mor-
ris.sey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). There we held 
that the revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal 
prosccutiou. 
"Parole arises after the encl of the criminal prose-
cution, including imposition of sentence. . . . Revo-
cation deprives an individual, not of the absolute 
liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only 
of the conditional liberty properly dependent on 
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Even though the revocation of parole is not a part 
of the criminal prosecution, we held that the loss of 
liberty entailed is a serious deprivation requiring that 
the parolee be accorded clue process. Specifically, we 
held that a parolee is entitled to two hearings, one a 
preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and deten-
tion to determine whether there is probable cause to be-
lieve that he has committed a violation of his parole and 
tho other a somewhat more comprehensive hearing prior 
to the making of the final revocation decision. 
Petitioner does not contend that there is any differ-
ence relevant to the guarantee of clue process between 
tho revocation of parole and the revocation of probation, 
nor do we perceive one.~ Probation revocation, like 
parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, 
but does result in a loss of liberty.4 Accordingly, v.e hold 
that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a pre-
liminary and a final revocation hearing, under the con-
ditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra." 
3 Despite the undoubted minor differences between probation and 
pnrole, the commentntors have agreed that revocation of probation 
where sentence hns been imposed previously is constitutionally in-
distinguishable from the revocation of parole. See, e. g., Van Dyke, 
Parole Revocation Henrings in California: The Right to Counsel, 
59 Calif. L. Rev. 1215, 1241-1243 (1971); Sklar, Law and Practice in 
Probation and Parole Revocation Hearing~, 55 J. Crim. L. C. & 
P. S. 175, 198 n. 182 (1964). 
4 It is clear at least after Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, that a 
probationer can no longer be denied due process, in rcliame on the 
dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935), tha1 proba1ion 
i8 an "act of grace." 
5 Petitioner argues in addition that the Morrissey henriug require-
ments impose serious practical problems in cases surh as the present 
onr in which a probationer or JXtro ee i8 allowed to leave the con-
victing State for supervision in another State. Snrh arrnngemcnts 
:no made pursuant to an interstate compact ndopte<l by all of the 
States, including vVi,;ron~in. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 57.13. Petitioner's 
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III 
The second, and more difficult, question posed by this 
case is whether an indigent probationer or parolee has a 
due process right to be represented by appointed counsel 
at these hearings.G In answering that question, we draw 
heavily on the opinion in Morrissey. Our first point of 
reference is the character of probation or parole. As 
noted in Morrissey regarding parole, the "purpose is to 
help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive 
individuals as soon as they are able .... " 408 U. S., at 
brief asserts that as of June 30, 1972, Wisconsin had a total of 642 
parolees and probationers under supervision in other States and that 
incomplete statistics as of June 30, 1971, indicated a national total 
of 24,693 persons under out-of-state supervision. Petitioner's Brief, 
pp. 21-22. 
Some amount of disruption inevitably attends auy new constitu-
~-----:tc""JO-:'.:r::-:rn:,l- r=t:,11:-::-in itt!d 1t}c arc confidentJtnat mod1ffcat1on of the inter-
state compact can remove without undue s~·ain . tee mica mr es 
to compliance with Morrissey. ~n additional comment is 
warranted with respect to the rights to present witnesses and to 
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Petitioner's greatest 
concern is with the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from 
perhaps thousands of miles away. While in some cases there is· 
simpl_v no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that 
we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate· 
of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits, 
depositions, and documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to fore-
close the States from holding both the preliminary and the final hear-
ing~ at the place of violation or from developing other creative solu-
tions to the practical difficulties of the Morrissey requirrments. 
6 In :Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, we left open the question "whether 
the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained couusrl or to 
appointed counsel if he is indigent." 408 U. S., at 489. Since 
respondent did not attempt to retain c01msel but nsked only for 
appointed counsel, we ]rn,ye no occasion to decide in this case whether 
a probationer or parolee has a right to be rcprcscn1rd at a reyoca-
tion hearing by retained counsel in si1 uations other than those where· 
the State would be obliged to furnish counsel for an indigent. 
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477. The duty and attitude of the probation or parole 
officer reflect this purpose: 
"\Vhile the parole or probation officer recognizes 
his double duty to the ,yelfare ,of his clients and to 
the safety of the general community, by and large 
concern for the client dominates his professional at-
titude. The parole agent ordinarily defines his role 
as representing his client's best interests as long as 
these do not constitute a threat to public safety." 1 
Because the probation or parole officer's function is not 
so much to compel conformance to a strict code of be-
havior as to supervise a course of rehabilitation, he has 
been entrusted traditionally with broad discretion to 
judge the progress of rehabilitation in individual cases, 
and has been armed "·ith the power to recommend or 
even to declare revocation. 
In Morrissey, we recognized that the revocation de-
cision has two analytically distinct components: 
"The first step in a revocation decision involves a 
wholly retrospective factual question: whether the 
parolee has iu fact acted in violation of one or more 
conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined 
that the parolee did violate the conditions does the 
second question arise: should the parolee be recom-
mitted to prison or should other steps be taken to 
protect society and improve chances of rehabilita-
tion?" Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at 
479-480.8 
7 Remington, Nrwman, Kimball, i\frlli & Golcl~trin, Criminal .Jus-
ticr Aclmini~tration, l\Tateriab :illcl Ca,,rs 910-911 (1960). 
8 Thr factor:; rnlrring into the,;o drri.,ioM rdato ill major part 1o 
a profr~sional ornluation, b~· trninrcl proh:1 tion or parolr ofnrors, 
ns to thr ovrrall i,;oeial rradj 11~tmr11t of the offrllclor ill thr com-
munity, and inrludo ronsiclerntion of sueh Ynrinblrs ns l ho offrndrr's 
rrlationi-hip toward his family, his altitude toward tlw fnlfillmont 
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The parole officer's attitude toward these decisions reflects 
the rehabilitative rather than punitive focus of the pro-
bation/ parole system: 
"Revocation ... is, if anything, commonly treated 
as a failure of supervision. While presumably it 
,rnuld be inappropriate for a field agent never to 
revoke, the \\·hole thrust of the probation-parole 
movement is to keep men in the community, work-
ing with adjustment problems there, and using revo-
cation only as a last resort "·hen treatment has 
failed or is about to fail." 9 
But an exclusive focus on the benevolent attitudes of 
those who administer the probation/ parole system when 
it is working successfully obscures the modification in 
attitude ,Yhich is likely to take place once the officer has 
decided to recommend revocation. Even though the 
officer is not by this recommendation converted into a 
prosecutor committed to convict, his role as counsellor to 
the probationer or parolee is w;~~W+GB'Fm~e&.,....-7:,-, 
\Vhen the officer's view of the probationer's or parolee's 
conduct differs in this fundamental way from the btter's 
om1 view, due process requires that the difference be 
resolved before revocation becomes final. Both the pro-
of foiancial obligations, the extent of hi~ cooperation wil h the pro-
bation officer ns~igncd to his case, Iris per~ounl aRsoriation~, nml-
of cotir.;e-whet her there h:we been ~pcrifir nncl ~ignifie:rnt Yiolnt ions 
of the conditions of the probation. The impor1nnce of these con-
siderations, some factual and others entirely judgnwntal, is illns1 rated 
by a Wi.,.,ron.sin empirical study wliich di~closed that Rome "lwrnt>·-
fh·e 1wrcent of the offenders studied r on probation or parole] who 
committed new offenses were [nevcrt hele~s) con1 inued on field 
~npervi,,;ion .... " S. Hunt, The Rernrat ion Deci~ion: A Study 
of Probation find P,1role Agent's Di~cretion (unpuhli~hed thr~i~ on 
file at the library of the Uni\·cr~it>· of \Yisron~in) (196+), ei1ccl in 
Petitionrr's Brief, Addendum, p. 106. 
9 Rrmington, Nc\rm.'\n, Kimball, Melli & Goldstein, supra, n. 7, at 
910-911. 
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bationor or parolee and tho State have interests in the 
accurate finding of fact aJJd the informed use of discre-
tion, the probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty 
is not unjustifiably taken away and the State to make 
certain that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a suc-
cessful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently prej udic-
ing the safety of the community. 
It was to serve all of these interests that Morrissey 
mandated preliminary and final revocation hearings. At 
the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is en-
titled to notice of the alleged violations of probation or 
parole, an opportunity to appear and to present evidence 
in his own behalf, a couditional right to confront ad-
verse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and a 
·written report of the hearing. NI orrissey v. Brewer, 
supra, 408 U. S., at 487. The final hearing is a less sum-
mary one because the decision under consideration is the 
ultimate decision to revoke rather than a mere determi-
nation of probable cause, but the "minimum requirements 
of due process" include very similar elements: 
"(a) written notice of the claimed violations of 
[probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the {pro-
bationer or] parolee of evidence against him; ( c) op-
portunity to be heard in person and to present 
witnesses and documentary evidence; ( d) the right 
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses ( un-
less the hearing officer specifically finds good cause 
for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and 
detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole 
board, members of which need not be judicial officers 
or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the fact-
finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking [probation or] parole." M orrissery v. 
Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at 489. 
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These requirements in themselves serve as substantial 
protection against ill-considered revocation, and peti-
tioner argues that counsel need never be supplied. What 
this argument overlooks is that the effectiveness of the 
rights guaranteed by Morrissey may in some circum-
stances depend on the use of skills which the probationer-
or parolee is unlikely to possess. Despite the informal 
nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical 
rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or unedu-
cated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in 
presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the 
presentation requires the examining or cross-examining 
of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex doc-
umentary evidence. 
By the same token, we think that the Court of Ap-
peals erred in accepting respondent's contention that the 
State is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel 
for indigents in all probation or parole revocation cases. 
While such a rule has the appeal of simplicity, it would 
impose direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages 
without regard to the need or the likelihood in a par-
ticular case for a constructive contribution by counsel. 
In most cases, the probationer or parolee has been con-
victed of committing another crime or has admitted the 
charges against him.10 And while in some cases he 
may have a justifiable excuse for the violation or a con-
vincing reason why revocation is not the appropriate· 
disposition, mitigating evidence of this kind is often not 
susceptible of proof or is so simple as not to require either 
investigation or exposition by counsel. 
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceed-
ing will alter significantly the nature of the proceeding. 
If counsel is provided for the probationer or parolee, the· 
10 Sec Sklar, supra, n. 3, at 192 (parole), 193 (probation). 
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State in turn \\'ill normally provide its own counsel; 
lawyers, by training and disposition, are advocates and 
bound by professional duty to present all available evi-
dence and arguments in support of their clients' po-
sitions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence 
and views. The role of the hearing body itself, aptly 
described in Morrissey as being "predictive and discre-
tionary" as well as factfinding, may become more akin 
to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the 
rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or 
parolee. In the greater self-consciousness of its quasi-
judicial role, the hearing body may be less tolerant of 
marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to 
reincarcerate rather than continue nonpunitive rehabili-
tation. Certainly, the decisionmaking process will be 
prolonged , and the financial cost to the State-for ap-
pointed counsel. counsel for the State, a longer record, 
and the possibility of judicial review- will not be 
insubstantial.11 
In some cases, these modifications in the nature of the 
revocation hearing must be endured and the costs borne 
because, as we have indicated above, the probationer's or 
parolee's version of a disputed issue can fairly be repre-
sented only by a trained advocate. But due process is 
not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in 
informality, flexibility, and economy must always be 
sacrificed. 
In so concluding, ·we are of course a·ware that the case-
by-case approach to the right to counsel in felony prosccu-
11 ThC' :-< ropC' of 1 hr praetir:il prohlrm \\'hieh would br orr:i~ionrd 
b~· a rr quirrmrnt of eoun~rl in all r r , ·oration r:i~e~ is ~uirii:r~tecl by 
ihe fart that in thr mid-1960'~ thrrr " ·rrr an r~timntrd :11·rr:1gr of 
20,000 ::iclult frlon.,· p:irolr rr\'Or:ition~ :ind 108,000 :idult prob:ttion 
rp,·oc-a tion~ r:1rl1 ~·ra r. Prr~idr111 '~ Comrni~~ion on Law En f orrc-
mrnt ::i nd Admini~lrnt ion of .Tu~t ier, T:1~k Foree Rrport: Thr Courts 
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tions adopted in Belts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (Hl42), 
"·as later rejected in favor of a ])er se rule in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 lT. S. 335 (1963). See also Argersinger 
v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972). \Ve do not, however, 
dra,Y from Gideon and 1lrgersi11uer the conclusion that a 
case-by-case approach to furnishing co11 nsel is necessarily 
inadequate to protect constitutional rights asserted in 
varying types of proceedings: there are critical differences 
between criminal trials and probation or parole revoca-
tion hearings, and both society and the probationer or 
parolee have stakes in preserving these differences. 
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a pros-
ecutor; formal rules of evidence are in force; a defendant 
enjoys a number of procedural rights which may be lost 
if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial. a defendant 
must make a presentation understandable to untrained 
jurors. In short, a criminal trial under our system is 
an adversary proceeding with its own unique character-
istics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the 
State is represellted not by a prosecutor but by a parole 
officer with the orientation described above; formal pro-
CC'dures and rules of evidence are not employed; and 
the members of the hearing body arc familiar with the· 
problems and practice of probation or parole. The need 
for counsel at revocation hearings derives not from the 
invariable attributes of those hearings but rather from 
the peculiarities of particular cases. 
The differences bet,Yeen a criminal trial and a revoca-
tion hearing do not dispose altogether of the argument 
that under a case-by-case approach there may be cases 
in which a lawyer would be useful but in which none 
would be appointed because an arguable defense would 
be uncovered only by a lawyer. Without denying that 
there is some force in this argument, we think it a suffi-
cient answer that we deal here not with the right of an 
accused to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with 
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the more limited due process right of one who is a pro-
bationer or parolee only because he has been co1wicted 
of a crime.1 " 
We thus find no justification for a new inflexible con-
stitutional rule ,Yith respect to the requirement of coun-
sel. We think. rather, that the decision as to the need 
for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the 
exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority 
charged with responsibility for administering the proba-
tion and parole system. Although the presence and par-
ticipation of counsel will probably be both undesirable 
and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hear-
ings, there will reinain certain cases in which fundamental 
fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require that 
the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent pro-
bationers or parolees. 
It is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to fornrn-
late a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed 
in determining when the providing of counsel is neces-
sary to meet the applicable due process requirements. 
The facts and circumstances in preliminary and final 
hearings are susceptible of almost infinite variation, and 
a considerable discretion must be allowed the responsible 
agency in making the decision. Presumptively, it may 
be said that counsel should be provided in cases where, 
after being informed of his right to request counsel, the 
probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on 
a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not com-
12 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967), establishing a juvenile's 
right to appointed counsrl i11 a delinquency proceeding which while 
deuominated civil was functionally akin to a criminal trial. A 
.iuv0nilc charged with violation of a generally applicable ;;ta111te is 
different!~· situated from an already-convicted probationer or parolee, 
and is entitled to a higl1C'r degree of protection. See In re Winship, 
397 U. S. 358 (1970) (the standard of proof in a juvenile drlinquency 
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mitted the alleged violation of the conditions upon which 
he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a 
matter of public record or is uncontested, there are sub-
stantial reasons which justified or mitigated the viola-
tion and make revocation inappropriate and that the 
reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or 
present. In passing on a request for the appointment of 
counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, 
especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer ap-
pears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. 
In every case in v,:hich a request for counsel at a pre-
liminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for re-
fusal should be stated succinctly in the record. 
IV 
We return to the facts of the present case. Because 
respondent was not afforded either a preliminary hear-
ing or a final hearing, the revocation of his probation did 
not meet the standards of due process prescribed in 
Morrissey, which we have here held applicable to proba-
tion revocations. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to 
a writ of habeas corpus. On remand, the District Court 
should allow the State an opportunity to conduct such 
a hearing. As to whether the State must provide coun-
sel, respondent's admission to having committed another 
serious crime creates the very sort of situation in which 
counsel need not ordinarily be provided. But because of 
respondent's subsequent assertions regarding that admis-
sion, see p. 2, ante, we conclude that the failure of the 
Department to provide respondent with the assistance 
of counsel should be re-examined in light of this opinion. 
The general guidelines outlined above should be applied 
in the first instance by those charged with conducting the 
revocation hearing. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in parl, and remanded. 
